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Abstract
The United Kingdom is entering a period of great uncertainty, with the future of
Scotland’s membership still in question. Following personal work experience in the Scottish
Parliament, it became apparent to me that the Scottish National Party currently finds itself in a
unique position. By utilizing constituency maps, this study will trace the evolution of the Scottish
National Party (SNP) and explore how its changing nature allowed it to grow from a minute
populist group seeking independence to a social justice party hoping to appeal to a more diverse
group of voters by increasing credibility at the local level and then into a fully-fledged third party
capable of entering into coalition with the political establishment at Westminster and holding a
membership referendum. Focus will be placed on the changing political landscape of the United
Kingdom and the SNP’s role within that scope. The paper will conclude with predictions of the
possibilities for the SNP’s role in Scotland, within the UK and the European Union.
The development of the SNP was aided and impacted by a number of variables. Firstly,
devolution from Westminster following the creation of a Scottish parliament, Holyrood, in the
1990s gave the SNP a second arena in which to demonstrate their governing ability. Secondly,
the role of certain personalities must be noted, with important figures having an impact in both
Westminster and Holyrood. The most well-known of these figures is Alex Salmond, the first
SNP First Minister, who was able to guide the SNP from obscurity to a governing party, capable
of holding referendums. In addition, Nicola Sturgeon, the current First Minister and Salmond’s
deputy First Minister, has been vital to continuing the party’s momentum in the wake of Brexit.
Down in Westminster, other personalities will also be important, such as Margaret Thatcher,
David Cameron and Theresa May. Thirdly, the British media’s coverage of the SNP had a
dramatic impact on the viability of the party to the electorate.
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Introduction
The political landscape of the United Kingdom has been steady and unchanging for
almost 100 years. But recently, the traditional Labour or Conservative choice for British voters
has begun to disintegrate in the wake of a credible third-party alternative – The Scottish National
Party (SNP). The SNP have been able to evolve and consolidate their influence within Scotland
and to effect change far beyond what is traditionally expected of a third-party. The SNP emerged
as a political force in the late 1960s as a populist party with the sole goal being independence for
Scotland. Although this proved popular with a small percent of Scottish voters, most voters were
looking to vote for a political party with more than one issue in its platform. In order to broaden
their base, the SNP worked to expand their platform to appeal to soft Labour and Conservative
voters. By doing this, the SNP was able to avoid the fate that often awaits a populist party.
Typically, in other states, populist parties lose their support when their mandates are either
achieved or taken up by other parties, leading to their disintegration. The SNP managed to avoid
this by adding various social justice issues to their platform. This phase of the SNP was
characterized by the leadership of Alex Salmond, who led the SNP during this crucial time for
the party. The transition from being populist to social democrats is an exceptionally rare
occurrence. As I will highlight during the literature review, populist parties tend not to transition
to the next stage of development but rather fall apart. I argue that the SNP is the only populist
party in British political history that has been able to cement their position and become a viable
third party.
Prior to the arrival of Alex Salmond, a prominent pro-independence Scottish politician,
the party had struggled to function with the power split between Westminster and the party
National Executive Committee (Hassan, Ed, 2009). As is common with most political parties, it
can prove difficult to maintain a strong central authority with so many actors with various

1

interests. Under Salmond, the party transformed from a disorganized catastrophe to a campaign
and election force to be reckoned with. The SNP further improved its performance in elections
with the creation of a voter ID and communication strategy.
The SNP owes its strong performance to the leadership of Alex Salmond. With the
chaotic period of the 1980s behind them, the SNP were able to seize the opportunity and begin to
challenge the dominance of the Conservatives and Labour. As the party became more credible,
their policy platform began to resonate further and reach greater volumes of voters. The power of
the SNP was demonstrated by the successful devolution referendum in 1997. It seems that many
scholars have been waiting for the SNP to finally fail and begin its collapse (Lynch, 2013).
However, the SNP has been able to continue its upward motion as a result of the foundation laid
by Alex Salmond in the 80s and 90s. The SNP has been able to maintain its command over the
Scottish parliament and even managed to extend their power at Westminster.
It is evident that the widespread influence of the SNP has been significantly underresearched in Scotland or it has been studied through the lens of nationalism and not through the
lens of British politics. It is too simplistic to continue to characterize the SNP as a fringe, oneissue party anymore as they were seen in the 1960s. The SNP has gone through three stages – the
populist stage, the social justice stage and the third-party stage. This study aims to trace this
remarkable rise and attempt to discover how the SNP has been able to change the face of British
politics. The three stages of populism, social justice and third-party will form the framework for
the study. There are both internal and external events that will be discussed along the way such
as party leadership, general elections and referenda.
This research highlights that the support for the Scottish National Party comes and goes
during certain contextual events. However, the Scottish National Party’s impact is not simply
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measured by the number of seats in parliament. Instead, the SNP has been far more fundamental
in bringing the issues that the Scottish people want discussed to Westminster and no longer
allowing the political establishment of the UK to ignore the needs of Scotland (Lynch, 2002).
Furthermore, they have forced the policy issue of independence for Scotland onto the UK’s
political agenda and seems to be a permanent fixture on the face of British politics.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
It is essential to begin by tracing the development of the Scottish National Party (SNP)
and finding the catalyst that allowed them to begin their rise. The party was established in 1934
and was a combination of two separate parties – the National Party of Scotland and the Scottish
Party (Hassan, Ed, 2009). It is unprecedented for a fringe party such as the Scottish National
Party to rise up to become a player in Scottish politics, far more unprecedented that it would
become a player at Westminster (Mitchell et al, 2012). The unification of the two independenceoriented parties to form the SNP were able to rally their support and reach “the kind of electoral
market share that is unheard of in British politics” (Mitchell, Johns, 2016).
Hassan asserts that modern Scottish politics can be split into three stages – 1967-79,
1979-97 and then 97-present. These stages closely coincide with the model that has been
constructed for this study. The beginning of the first stage and where this study will begin is
marked by the SNP’s first major win in the Hamilton by-election in 1967. This acted as the
catalyst for the SNP to begin making more serious attempts at stealing seats from the UK
political establishment – Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives (Macwhirter,
2014). In the next phase of development from 1979-97, the SNP were able to further develop and
solidify their perception as being the resistant party to the status quo. These were the years of
Margaret Thatcher and John Major, which were the years in which the difference in values of
Scotland and the rest of the UK became further divided and evident. In the final stage, the SNP
were able to channel the frustrations of their new voter base and play their first major role in
Scottish politics. The growing support of the SNP payed off with the creation of a Scottish
Parliament in 1999 and then the SNP were eventually finally able to enter government as a
minority administration in 2007. Following the creation of the Scottish parliament, the SNP were
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able to take on Westminster elections and continue to erode the status-quo.
Furthermore, there are three pre-requisites for the SNP to do well at the polls (Mitchell,
Johns, 2016). Firstly, they need an event that highlights the relevance of the “Scottish question”.
For example, it must be an event that indicates the divergence between Scottish politics and
Westminster, as well as indicating a need for self-government. A perfect example of this kind of
event that has led to the re-emergence of the Scottish question is Brexit. The vote to leave the EU
in June 2016 is a classic example that exposes the divergence between Scottish politics and the
rest of the UK. Secondly, there must be a perception that the election outcome is in the balance
between the two major parties – Labour and Conservatives – and that the SNP are the only ones
offering an alternative. Thirdly, the SNP must be viewed as a viable and electable force in
Scotland. If there is a possibility of a hung parliament, when neither party gain enough seats to
command a majority that can govern, the SNP are able to provide voters with a replacement
choice. One of the main successful tactics used by the SNP is that they are able to perceive
Westminster as the enemy and this in turn, leads to a unification among the Scottish electorate.
The ability to unite a group against an oppressor or an elite is a common strategy utilized
by populist parties. In recent years, there has been much debate on what populist parties actually
are and how to define them. One particularly powerful definition is utilized in ‘The Populist
Persuasion’, which defines populism as “a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people
as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class; view their elite opponents as self-serving
and undemocratic; and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.” (Kazin, 1998). The arrival
of populist parties often highlights the beginning of a political crisis and function as catalysts for
political change. The SNP emerged as a populist party with the issue of independence at the
center but also with the belief that Scotland was not being represented fairly at Westminster.
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Populist parties develop well by being able to unite a group against a common enemy or
oppressor which in this case was the UK government elites. Many of the populist parties that
dominate the headlines today are viewed negatively on account that they have attempted to unite
a group against a group such as refugees or the poor. An example of this is the National Front in
France under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, who sought to unite the French electorate against
refugees and those of the Islamic faith. Another recent example of a populist party in British
politics has been the UK Independence Party (UKIP). The party was characterized as a far-right
conservative party with one of its key platform positions being to decrease immigration to the
UK. In addition, they were incredibly skeptical of the European Union. This policy platform
attracted typically Conservative party voters to switch to UKIP. Arguably, following the EU
referendum in 2016, they accomplished their mandate of removing the UK from the EU
(Goodwin, Milazzo, 2015). For this reason, the voters that had felt represented by UKIP went
back to the Conservative party.
In the case of the SNP, they instead developed an inclusive and left-wing base which
allowed it to garner support from those that weren’t as passionate about on independence. The
group they have rallied against are in fact Westminster. By developing a left-wing agenda, the
SNP were able to go beyond just being a populist party and avoid the fate of UKIP. This is the
beginning of the social justice stage under the leadership of Alex Salmond which in turn led to
the increasing credibility of the SNP’s platform and performance. Salmond identified three main
issues to rally around – “support a real Scottish resistance…an enlarged public sector… and
armed neutrality” (Mitchell, Johns, 2016). Furthermore, Salmond asserted his support for civil
disobedience and strikes on a mass scale if it proved necessary. These three main issues attracted
an ever-larger voter base, especially among young students. By mobilizing the younger
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generation, the SNP ensured that they were reaching a large demographic that would continue
the party for years to come.
This development allowed the SNP to become an opposition party and then the governing
party in the Scottish parliament, enabling them to call for their long sought-after independence
referendum in 2014. What is also truly remarkable about the SNP is despite the fact that the 2014
independence referendum was unsuccessful, the party did not immediately collapse. They had
consolidated their influence and gone beyond the sole issue of independence. Although the issue
remains its banner issue, the SNP continues to thrive in the Scottish parliament and even has
reached new heights at Westminster. Even though many Scots are opposed to independence, the
SNP have created the image that only they can fight for Scotland while Scottish Labour and the
Scottish Conservatives are just Westminster clones that will go along with the status-quo.
The aim of this study is not to trace the roots of the nationalism back to the beginning of
Scotland’s union with England in the 19th century. Rather, the study will begin with a brief
overview of where the case for Scottish Nationalism came from in the 20th century and how it
manifested itself into a political issue. There are three major factors that have led to the
disintegration of the Scots sense of “Britishness” which have slowly begun to diminish which
coincides with the rise of the Scottish National Party. Firstly, Scotland used to have a great
amount of wealth on account of a strong industrial trade, which has since dried up in the
aftermath of WWII. Secondly, Scotland had also enjoyed benefits from the British empire, such
as employment and trade, which slowly dwindled as the empire slid away. Thirdly, the religious
differences between Scotland and England became more and more pronounced, and this
translated into politics. For instance, Protestantism became the religion of the Conservative party
whereas the Catholics became more associated with the Labour party. The SNP were often
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known as the “Tartan Tories” on account of their Protestant roots by the Catholic-leaning Labour
party (Colley, 2005). These three variables (profit, peripheries and Protestantism) further isolated
Scotland from the rest of the UK, thus giving fuel to the SNP.
What is truly unprecedented about the SNP is the way in which they took an issue that
formed the heart of their platform and were able to convert and persuade the electorate who had
previously had little to no appetite for Scottish independence. The SNP can be described as both
“an insurgency and also an established party of government.” (Macwhirter, 2014). The remaking
of the SNP is a complex chain of events, but it is essential to have an understanding of them if
one hopes to understand Scottish politics as a whole.
An important variable that will be addressed throughout the study is the role of the media
in the way in which the SNP is perceived across the UK. The British media are an essential actor
that have the power to sway the British public against or in support of a cause. This variable
becomes particularly important in the lead up to the 2014 independence referendum with the
various media sources taking opposing sides. Iain Macwhirter’s ‘Disunited Kingdom: How
Westminster Won a Referendum but Lost Scotland’ analyzes the role of the British press and the
way in which the anti-independence side were able to use the press to diminish the credibility of
the pro-independence side. For instance, the UK press and the Conservative party often refer to
the “SNP menace” (Macwhirter, 2014) which arguably backfire and only contributed further to
the unification of the Scottish electorate behind the SNP.
Some attribute the rise of the SNP to the process of devolution. This is far too simplistic
of an assessment. Although devolution played a role for the SNP being able to create a smaller,
more local arena in which to perform, there were many other variables at work. The process of
devolution is the passing down of certain policy powers from Westminster to the Scottish
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Parliament (commonly referred to as Holyrood). I argue that although devolution contributed to
the SNP’s gain in popularity, the SNP’s impressive internal development cannot be ignored. The
devolved Scottish parliament acted as a new political arena for the SNP to adapt to and perform
well in order to increase their credibility. Westminster sending powers back to Scotland and the
Scottish parliament gave the SNP the ability to prove themselves as a legitimate governing force
to be reckoned with. Arguably, devolution made the case for independence stronger because it
became clear that the Scottish people could govern themselves on devolved issues like education
and health. This led many Scots to question if Scotland needs Westminster at all.
It is important to note that the SNP’s rise also seems to coincide with an era of decline for
both of Scotland’s dominant political parties- Labour and the Conservatives. It is no coincidence
that during the literature review, books titled ‘The Strange Death of Labour Scotland’ and ‘An
Important Matter of Principle: The Decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party’
were found. As these two major parties struggle to reinvent themselves and continue to appeal to
their traditional voter base, this provides the SNP with an opportunity to pick up these unsure
voters. On the other hand, there are no shortage of books and articles attempting to find the
variables that the SNP can attribute their success to. There are both internal and external factors.
For instance, devolution and Brexit are external factors. The leadership of Alex Salmond and the
development of the SNP’s political machinery are internal factors.
Whilst analyzing the literature, it is apparent that there are already some scholars
predicting and waiting for the collapse of the Scottish National Party. It is my view that this
assertion is premature. There were times throughout the party’s development when it seemed
likely that the SNP would fade into oblivion. Examples of this include when the party had a
pitiful financial structure and organization or in 1979 following the failed devolution
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referendum. Naturally, following the failed 2014 independence referendum, it was believed that
the loss would damage the party (Lynch, 2013). Arguably, the SNP is entering its prime time for
continuing to build their social justice platform and continue working towards their central issue
– independence. Although it was expected that the failed independence referendum of 2014
would be the turning point, it seems that this has not been the case. Although the SNP seem
invincible, there is one fatal flaw that has been pointed out by John Robbs and James Mitchell.
This flaw will prevent the SNP fully replacing Labour as the true opposition to the
Conservatives. The Scottish National Party is a sub-state party running in a state-wide election.
This will always damage their governing credentials. Although the status-quo of Labour vs.
Conservatives is slowly eroding, this order is still strong enough to prevent the SNP breaking
through. In the lead up to general elections, most voters in the UK are more concerned with who
is governing at Westminster, and not be how much autonomy Scotland can gain. It is pointed out
that a period of constitutional calm is what could truly damage the SNP (Mitchell, Johns, 2016).
If this was to occur, the SNP would be unlikely to be able to fulfill their constitutional ambition
of independence and this in turn could allow the tide to turn.
After working in the Scottish parliament for a time, I observed another possible weakness
of the SNP. Their constitutional goal of independence has the power to unite its followers, but it
also has the ability to unite opposition groups. During the 2017 general election, it became
apparent to me that there is no issue quite like independence that highlights the fervent
opposition some Scots hold for independence. This opposition is especially fervent with the
possibility of a 2nd independence referendum that remains a key part of the SNP’s platform. It’s
common to hear Scots express their appreciation for the social justice side of the SNP’s platform
but they just wish they would abandon the desire for independence. Obviously, the dismissal of
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independence is unthinkable. This issue was the very reason the party formed in the first place.
This begs the question – how can the SNP continue to expand their base with such a
controversial issue at its core?
The party has been handed a great gift with the decision to pursue Brexit. This event has
given the SNP one of the conditions pointed out by John Robbs and James Mitchell – an event
that highlights the need to re-evaluate the “Scottish Question” and a way to highlight the
disconnect between Scottish and Westminster politics. What makes the development of the SNP
truly remarkable is the velocity at which they have risen to power. However, could the SNP let
this rise get away from them and fail to reign in their diverse support and channel their electoral
power for the better of Scotland?
Chapter 2: The Roots of the Party
The Early Days of the SNP
The party was created in 1934 around the core issue of independence. As noted in the
literature review, the Scottish National Party was a combination of the National Party of
Scotland and the Scottish Party (Hassan, Ed, 2009). Although both parties shared an affinity for
Scottish nationalism, it proved incredibly difficult for these two parties combine into one.
Reasons for this include divisions over ideological objectives as well as disagreements on the
most pragmatic strategies. As these cracks in the SNP’s policy platform worsened, so too did
their electoral performance. The group struggled to find funds that they could then use to
participate in the general election.
The 1940s was a period of idleness on account of World War II and only increased the
frustrations of the party. The party began to split into those that wanted to attempt a cross-party
approach and the other side that remained insistent that they should remain an independence
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political party (Hassan, Ed. 2009). Once the war was over, the country began to return to
normalcy and business as usual could commence. The more radical side of the SNP once again
fragmented into the ‘Scottish National Convention’, who eventually disintegrated as a result of
failing to translate their electoral support to actual political power.
It has been pointed out that generally, being a single-issue party is commonly a
disadvantage (Hassan, Ed, 2009). If a single-issue party hopes to ever win political power, it will
only happen if the single-issue they stand for is of enormous importance to the electorate at that
time. Unfortunately, in the early days of the SNP, the issue of independence was of little
consequence to the average Scot voting in an election. It is for this reason that the performance
of the party progressed at a dismal pace. With the British political establishment paying them no
attention, the SNP seemed destined to eventually disintegrate as its sub-groups of supporters
broke away and would then be of no impact to the United Kingdom.
In the 1950s and 1960s, following the unstable period and breaking away of the more
radical faction, the SNP were able to begin to establish the core of their identity (Hassan, Ed,
2009). This was a period of development for the SNP as they struggled to do well in general
elections. The SNP was able to learn from the mistakes of the National Convention who had
demonstrated that with just the desire for independence was not enough of a political policy to
hold the attention of the electorate. In addition to this development, the 1950s highlighted that a
cross-party approach wasn’t going to be enough to achieve independence. Labour and the
Conservatives were either too pro-union or too preoccupied with their own policy platform to
take self-governing in Scotland seriously. As a result, it became evident that the only way for
progress to be made on the issue was by continuing to develop a political party dedicated to the
pursuit of independence. If they were to make any progress, it was apparent that the SNP would
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have to make the case to the Scottish people that independence was in their best interest as well
as appeal to them with other issues on their platform.
It is practical to now think back to the three requirements for the SNP to do well at the
polls that were set forth by Mitchell and Johns. For the SNP to be considered an alternative to the
two main parties, there must be an event or situation that raises the “Scottish question” and there
must be a perception that election is just between Labour and the Conservatives. (Mitchell,
Johns, 2016). With this criteria in mind, the 1960s were a critical period for the SNP. The poor
performance of the Scottish economy despite growing government intervention only increased
the divide between Scottish politics and British politics (Hassan, Ed, 2009). Wages and standards
of living were poor despite numerous economic policies attempting to reverse the trend. In
addition to this, the SNP had the advantage of being a party from Scotland that wanted to
represent the people of Scotland. Whereas, the Scottish Labour and Scottish Conservative Party
were seen as as being too heavily reliant on their Westminster bases. The SNP were able to build
a reputation for themselves at the local level and appear as more representative of the Scottish
electorates opinions. Arguably, it is this grassroots local effort that has allowed the SNP to
develop and stand out from the other mainstream parties.
It is at this stage that we would categorize the SNP as a populist party. Their sole issue of
interest was independence and it was at this stage that it became clear a single issue would not be
sufficient if the SNP hoped to make any electoral gains to achieve independence. By populist
party, I mean a political party that uses “a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people
as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class; view their opponents as self-serving and
undemocratic; and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.” (Kazin, 1998). Furthermore, I
classify the SNP at this stage as a leftwing populist party. In this case, the party aims to
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champion the people against the elite or establishment (Judis, 2016). Arguably, the Scottish
National Party emerged because of the strong desire to gain independence from the
establishment at Westminster. This was a policy goal that had been ignored by the UK political
establishment and therefore, there was a vacuum for the SNP to seize the issue.
However, the SNP was more than a populist party at this stage of development. The
party’s ethos was established in the early stages of its development. The two central elements of
this ethos are decentralization and participation (Mitchell et al, 2012). Whilst they were mainly
seen as a self-determination dominated party, they also utilized a more democratically organized
strategy to remain in tune with their electorate and could thus be more responsive to local issues.
Firstly, the SNP proclaimed themselves a self-government seeking party, not a party seeking
independence. This ensured a prolonging of the mandate to have a Scottish National Party.
Secondly, because the SNP weren’t taken seriously and seen as an extra-Parliamentary party
(Mitchell et al, 2012), meaning it was much more active in local government and didn’t really
pay much attention to Westminster activities. This changed later down the line when the SNP
began to pick up more seats in general elections.
Regarding the basic organization of the party, the SNP stayed away from the typical
organizational structure in UK political parties. Usually, the party has a formal leader who is
often seen as the face of the party and have the most control. In the case of the SNP, they stayed
away from using this and instead, had a party chairman until 2004 (Mitchell et al, 2012). In
addition, the party chairman was not one of the Members of Parliament; instead, they worked
outside Westminster. This system continued to work but as the number of MPs grew, the SNP
were forced to come up with more senior-level positions to better organize the party. A valuable
observation to take away from this period is the high level of importance that the SNP had for
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their party members and further, their electorate. After all, the party members were the ones
working as activists at the local level, looking to expand their membership and support. The
party relied on their membership for logistical and financial support (Levy, 1990). I argue that
this relationship between the party and their supporters is what has allowed the SNP to build
further on their support and grow.
Furthermore, it is evident from this that the SNP established their strengths early on in
their development. However, because of their reliance on working at the local level and focusing
on activism, they often struggled to find a stable financial situation. The SNP didn’t have a
Westminster base the way the other UK parties did. This meant that the SNP had to rely on their
members for support in their early days. The SNP have managed to keep this outsider tone to this
day but it comes from the early days of the party.
The point at which the Scottish National Party became politically relevant was in the
1967 by-election in Hamilton, in Lanarkshire, which acted as the first big turning point for the
Scottish National Party. Many Scottish politics scholars seem to refer to this victory as the birth
of Scottish politics (Hassan, Ed, 2009). Until this period, the Scottish National Party had been
perceived as a fragmented group of outsiders and were completely ignored by both Labour and
the Conservatives. I argue that the twenty-year period prior to 1967 was a period of adjustment
in which the SNP were able to craft the beginning of an ideology and party platform, rather than
focusing solely on winning seats. Underestimating the SNP proved to be an error of judgment for
the political establishment. Prior to the by-election in Hamilton, the SNP contested 23 seats and
won 5% of the vote (Hassan, Ed, 2009).
Winnie Ewing, the Scottish National Party candidate, was able to win the Hamilton seat
with a 46% share of the vote and with a 38% swing from Labour (Mitchell and Johns, 2012).
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This was the breakthrough that the party had been waiting for. With one foot finally in the door
at Westminster, Ewing was able to pave the way for the Scottish National Party to begin
consolidating its position and expanding its network across Scotland. This Labour-SNP
competition dynamic that emerged in the election was also important because it set the tone for
the relationship the two parties would build in the years following. The issue of independence
tended to appeal to the left-leaning industrial worker that was an obvious Labour voter until the
SNP arrived. In this regard, the SNP turned out to be the Labour party’s worst nightmare as they
began to snatch their voter base.
The beginning of an SNP Ideology
At this point, it is prudent to expand on the elements of the Scottish National Party’s
early ideology. As previously mentioned, their central pillar was self-government. Initially, this
vague term often caused rifts between members of the party. Some thought that self-government
meant independence whilst others felt it just meant a stronger form of home rule from the United
Kingdom (Mitchell et al, 2012). The call for independence became the rallying call in the years
to follow. As well as self-government, devolution was a core part of the ideology that caused
some discourse. Some members of the party believed that devolution could work to Scotland’s
advantage and be a stepping stone towards self-government. On the other hand, members
suggested that this would become a road block and would prevent Scotland from ever fully
severing ties with the UK.
It is evident that at this point, the SNP was not like any other party in British politics for a
few reasons. Firstly, as I have pointed out, the party was organized in a way that gave the most
power and influence on the party members. This in turn prevented the formation of a hierarchical
organization, with the party leader being the sole face of the party. Secondly, the party embraced
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the perception that they were a party on the outside and not a part of the political establishment.
This liberated the SNP and meant that it was not judged by the same standards other parties and
were often underestimated.
As outlined previously, the SNP in the populist stage were ingenious because they were
able to channel their frustration towards the government at Westminster. This seemed to
permanently entrench the idea that the Scottish National Party was a party of protest. Populist
parties tend to establish a group or entity as their perceived enemy and then build their support
around that. A classic example of this is the SNP with Westminster. However, a more
contemporary example is the UK Independence Party or UKIP, who established themselves as a
far-right, anti-immigration party (Judis, 2016). UKIP based their entire electoral fortunes on the
hope that the voters would share their anti-immigrant fervor. However, for the SNP, by having
Westminster as the enemy, this then allowed the party to add leftist agenda policy and build its
credibility as an alternate to Labour and not become irrelevant like UKIP. The demographics of
the party also became significant because of the high percentage of young people becoming
involved with the party. The SNP supporters weren’t the only group coming from a young
demographic. During the 1960s, the average age of SNP national-office bearers and national
office candidates was 37.5 (Schwarz, 1970). At this stage of development, the most important
policy issue was independence but that was just the beginning of their party platform.
The SNP on the Rise
The Hamilton-by-election was a wakeup call for the UK political establishment as it
became apparent that despite the fact the SNP had a one-issue platform, they could become a
force to be reckoned with. When looking at the % vote gained by the SNP between 1960 and
1970, the party were able to increase from 1% of the vote to 11% (Levy, 1990).
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Despite the fact that Winnie Ewing lost the seat in the following general election, it is
important to note that from this point on, the SNP were a continuous presence at Westminster.
There were concerns that the party’s performance in the by-election could simply be ephemeral
and just a form of protest in the constituency (Bennie et. Al, 1997). In the 1970 election, the
party lost Winnie Ewing as an MP but were able to gain a seat in the Western Isles, which was
the first seat they had managed to win in a general election (Mitchell et al, 2012). In the 1970
general election, the SNP were able to find enough candidates to contest 65 out of 71 seats in
Scotland and jumped to 11% of the vote (Mitchell et al, 2012). Although initially skeptical of
Westminster, the SNP began to grow into their new arena and expand their presence further.
The rise of the SNP was not a smooth journey – there were of course electoral
knockbacks. The single victory in Hamilton did not mean that the SNP were suddenly a
mainstream party in the UK establishment (Hassan, Ed, 2009) but it was the beginning of the
SNP being noticed and recognized by Westminster parties. The Conservative government
responded with a new plan for devolution. The Conservatives wanted to ensure that they could
stay in power for as long as possible. Therefore, they decided to support what came to be known
as the ‘Declaration of Perth’, which signaled the Conservatives support for devolution
(Cavanagh, 2001). The logic behind this decision was that it seemed with the SNP being able to
grow, they could be able to take votes away from Labour, further cementing the Conservatives
power. This was the beginning of the road to devolution and the eventual creation of a Scottish
parliament.
The Labour party responded differently to the rise of the SNP. The heart of their issue
with the SNP came from their strong desire to implement further social-welfare and leftist policy
UK-wide. In response to the growing support for the SNP, Labour set up their own policy to
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address the growing desire for home rule. During Harold Wilson’s time as Prime Minister, he set
up what came to be known as the Kilbrandon Commission (Cavanagh, 2001). This initiative was
an attempt for Labour to appear to be acting on the calls for independence by examining the
structure of the United Kingdom’s government. The commission investigated for four years and
examined various models that could better divide the powers across the regions of the UK. These
models included different forms of federalism and the possible division of the member states.
The commission eventually decided on a similar conclusion to that of the Conservatives’
‘Declaration of Perth’. They decided that devolving certain powers to Scotland would be the best
action (Cavanagh, 2001).
I argue that the UK political establishment were responsible for allowing the SNP to
continue to expand because both the Conservatives and Labour separately came up with the
solution of devolution. Although this seemed like the best strategy to appease the SNP and their
supporters, the move to create a policy of devolution seemed to be the turning point that would
eventually push the SNP from an unimportant, fringe party to being much more influential.
A factor that must be considered and remains relevant to the current day is the role of
media with regard to the SNP’s journey. It was argued by political opponents that the SNP were
often given more media attention than their electoral support warranted (Hassan, Ed, 2009). The
main reason for this was the fact that the SNP were such a lively party, they were “colorful,
enlivened the political scene and was often in step with a mood for change” (Hassan, Ed, 2009).
The SNP were almost always out campaigning and as previously mentioned, their message relied
on the participation and passion of party members. It is for this reason that the Westminster
establishment often felt threatened by the SNP. The SNP were a new and likeable force in
politics; compared with the traditional Tory vs. Labour order, the SNP were always more likely
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to capture the media’s attention. The coverage of the SNP by the media is something I will
continue to address as the SNP develops into the next stages. In the social justice stage of
development, I will readdress whether the SNP’s constant media attention was a blessing or a
curse.
The SNP began to slowly but steadily add more policy positions from the Labour
platform in the years following 1967 and this led to large numbers of voters reconsidering their
allegiance to Labour. This trend would only be further exacerbated during the long era of
Margaret Thatcher as Labour fell into disarray and could no longer act as an effective opposition.
This ends the stage of populism and the SNP slowly slides slides into the category of a social
democratic party in the mid-1970s. Despite Westminster deciding to take them more seriously,
the SNP’s journey to increase their vote share was slow and it took many years.
Chapter 3: The Start of the Party Evolution
The Beginning of a New Policy Platform
There was no immediate need for the SNP to upgrade their policy platform during the
1940s and 50s. However, with the victory of Winnie Ewing and continuing growth of the party,
it was time for the party to formally lay out their goals. This new policy platform took the form
of a formal party manifesto, a common party strategy in UK politics. Although the goal of selfdetermination remained vital to their cause, they also became committed to obtain it within
democratic means, meaning within the United Nations and the Commonwealth (Wilson, 2009).
The party also asserted its cooperation to international cooperation and world peace.
Furthermore, the SNP grew internationalist and pro-EU, because of the need for economic
cooperation.
The SNP blamed most of the challenges facing Scotland on the British government and
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the accompanying events that they had caused. For instance, looking back as far as the 1950s, the
decline of Scotland’s heavy industry was a huge issue for Scotland that the SNP blamed
Westminster for (Wilson, 2009). Scotland were also dragged into two world wars that had
steadily began to highlight the difference in Scotland’s political leanings versus the rest of the
United Kingdom. As a result of this perception, the SNP were always keen to keep power
decentralized, even at the local level. Furthermore, as soon as the concept of devolution came
into the conversation, the SNP were quick to list the policy areas they believed should be given
back to Scotland. These included the control of land planning, development of coal and water
energy, control of agriculture, forestry and fishing policy. The party went further and demanded
the return to Scottish majority ownership of industry, rights for workers and a policy to favor
local business (Wilson, 2009). In addition, health policy and education policy were to be
devolved back to Scotland.
During the 1960s and early 70s, various policy issues were further various policy issues
were further discussed, such as the issue of banning nuclear weapons, which the party decided to
support. Winnie Ewing’s victory was the beginning of the SNP having a constant presence at
Westminster, which meant a more solid platform was required. During the National Council
Meeting in 1970, two major objectives were updated and re-established. Firstly, they asserted
their commitment to creating a national movement to restore independence via the creation an
independent parliament and government in a sovereign, independent Scotland. Secondly,
following the achievement of this goal, the SNP would continue to participate in Scottish
political life and act as an effective choice for the Scottish people looking for a political party
that would work to serve their policy needs. The second objective is particularly important
because it highlights the fact that the SNP were planning the longevity of their party very early in
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their development. Unlike other populist parties that were mentioned in the earlier chapters, the
SNP were planning to remain a political force, even after their core, mandated goal was achieved
(Kazin, 1998).
Alarm bells began to ring for the Labour party. The SNP were cementing themselves as a
leftward-oriented party, which put them directly in competition with Labour. This was
particularly worrying for the Scottish Labour Party, as the SNP had a distinct advantage over
them. Because Scottish Labour was just a faction of the National Labour Party, they were viewed
as a part of the Westminster establishment. The SNP were only competing in Scotland and
therefore, came across as much more in touch with the Scottish electorate. Furthermore, the
class-party connection was beginning to disintegrate. Prior to the 1950s, Scottish industrial
workers and those in the lower classes were almost certain to vote Labour. With the arrival of the
SNP, traditional Scottish Labour voters were faced with an alternate choice – a party that was
beginning to develop a left-ward agenda and a party that had much more of an interest at
pandering to Scottish voter’s concerns (Hassan, Ed, 2009).
In response, the Labour party began to nickname the SNP the “Tartan Tories” and the
Conservatives referred to the SNP as the “Tartan Socialists” (Mitchell & Johns, 2014). These
were both attempts to remind their traditional voter base that the SNP were not to be trusted as
all they cared about was getting independence. The SNP needed a more solid policy platform to
quiet the criticism that the SNP were just a group of people that want Scotland to break away
from the UK; they needed to prove that they were more than this.
The Arrival of Alex Salmond
Born in Linlithgow, Alex Salmond became an active member of the Scottish National
Party during his time at the University of St. Andrews. He identified as a far-left socialist and
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stressed the need for the SNP to continue its development towards the left. To achieve this goal,
Salmond was one of the founding members of what came to be known as the ‘79 group’, which
was founded in 1979 in an attempt to persuade the Scottish National Party that it should take a
left-wing position (Lynch, 2013).
The 79 group were instrumental in moving the SNP from the populist stage of
development to the social democrat stage. It was this internal party divide on whether the SNP
wanted to be more than just a party on independence. Alex Salmond and the rest of the 79 Group
wanted the SNP to move left and be able to challenge the Labour party’s monopoly on the left
(Hassan, Ed, 2009). It was this policy shift that seemed to finally eradicate the old criticism that
the SNP were simply “Tartan Tories”. The 79 Group were evicted from the party for the disquiet
they caused because their strategy to move the party to the left was to highlight the leadership
were incredibly right wing (Hassan, Ed, 2009).
Devolution: Part 1
The party began to promote the possibility of a Scottish parliament. This culminated in
the 1979 devolution referendum. Both the Conservatives and the Labour party had laid out
strategies earlier regarding the process of devolution. On the one hand, devolution was the
answer to the SNP’s prayers. This was a formal mechanism that could be utilized to bring further
power to Scotland and it was finally on the political agenda. On the other hand, it contributed to
the internal strife as party members began to disagree on the use of devolution as a means of
gradual independence. To a pragmatic member of the party, the possibility of devolution could
allow the SNP to become a more legitimate party that could govern and then build further
support for independence.
In 1976, the SNP had met at their annual party conference in Motherwell to discuss
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devolution (Hassan, Ed, 2009). The party decided to support devolution as a stepping stone
towards the goal of full independence. It was argued that this was a fatal mistake that would cost
them down the line by accepting anything less than independence. The SNP worked alongside
the Labour government in 1976 on account of the Labour Party no longer having a majority
number of seats in the House of Commons. The Labour government promised that they would
instigate legislation to start the process of devolving powers to Scotland in exchange for SNP
support. The legislation was introduced and then put to a vote on March 1st 1979. The results
were 48% against and 51% in favor with only 64% turnout which was not enough for the
referendum to pass. As a result of the ‘Cunningham Amendment’, without 40% of the electorate
voting in favor of devolution, further devolution could not take place (Mitchell, 2011).
A Bump in the Road
The SNP were able to build on their support in the 1970 and 1974 election, which was a
comfort to them, as it showed the parties support was not simply a form of protest from the
establishment (Bennie et al, 1997). Going into the 1979 election, the SNP had 30.4% of the vote
and eleven of Scotland’s seventy-one Members of Parliament. Unfortunately, following the 1979
election, only two remained and their support decreased to just 17.3%. This was the speed bump
that the other political parties in the UK had been waiting for. With Alex Salmond’s 79 Group
evicted from the party, it seemed evident that the SNP needed to re-evaluate their policy position
or risk slowly having their support eroded away.
As well as the ideological divide between left and right wingers, the way of achieving
independence remained a core part of the internal party debate. This led to the split between the
gradualists and the fundamentalists. This was a matter of whether the party needed to campaign
for immediate independence and nothing less or if a different approach should be undertaken.
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Other members of the party wanted to use the possible beginning of devolution to slowly
increase the appetite for independence within the country. The party decided that it would be
advantageous to use devolution as a strategy for the party to gain support.
The SNP were using the same tactics they had utilized in the 1960s, with a heavy reliance
on volunteers rather than on a full-time staff. There was still no formal leader, just a chairman,
which meant coming up with a cohesive message very difficult (Hassan, Ed, 2009). The party
also had financial worries to contend with. Establishing a central mechanism for raising money
for the party was difficult (Lynch, 2013). In the lead up to the bump in the road in 1979, the
party membership had increased substantially but this rapid growth was not sustainable. The
growth in membership didn’t lead to an increase in financial backing and this led to several
branches of the party verging on collapse by 1979.
An important commodity that Scotland possess became particularly important during this
period – oil. The SNP were able to use the commodity of oil as an electoral strategy. The SNP
utilized this newfound asset to their advantage by coming up with the slogan ‘It’s Scotland’s oil”
(Mitchell et al, 2012). The SNP insisted that the oil was being stolen by Westminster and being
used to control Scotland. Scotland’s oil has remained relevant since its discovery and continues
to be a matter of controversy within Scotland today, especially in 2014.
Following the 1974 election, the SNP had eleven MPs, which provided the party with a
fresh challenge. Nine of the eleven MPs were newcomers to Westminster and some were even
new to the SNP (Lynch, 2013). However, the SNP’s newfound electoral triumph was short lived.
The 1974 cohort of eleven SNP Members of Parliament, which had come to be known as the
football team, being reduced to two. Although the poor party organization and internal party
fighting were a part of this, there was more to the story. The SNP were part of one of the most
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dramatic nights in British politics in March of 1979. The football team were instrumental in the
defeat of the Labour Minority government, as their votes were used to form a vote of no
confidence against them.
The SNP made the decision to join the no confidence vote for several reasons. Firstly, the
Labour government under James Callaghan had been able to create his minority government by
working with the SNP and Plaid Cymru in Wales in exchange for offering devolution
referendums. As mentioned, the results in Scotland were incredibly close. The SNP felt robbed
of their chance to have a devolved legislature in Scotland. By bringing down Labour, the SNP
were instrumental in the arrival of the Thatcher government. In addition, this gave the Labour
Party a stick to beat the SNP with for years, as this was seen as an irresponsible policy decision.
It is important to mention that scholars have affirmed that whether the Labour government had
been brought down by the vote of confidence or not, it was almost assured that the Labour
government were destined to lose the upcoming 1979 election anyway, so it is erroneous to say
that SNP were single-handedly responsible for the new Tory government. However, this move
did irreparable damage for the SNP and their relationship with Labour voters. 1979 was the low
point for the SNP – they lost both the devolution referendum and their MP numbers decreased
from eleven to two (Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1 General Election 1979: Scotland
The Changing Policy Platform and Sociology of Scotland
With the victory of Winnie Ewing, the other political parties had taken notice of the
Scottish National Party but the attention did not last. As the party gradually built up its base, the
continued internal strife prevented the party from fully developing and entering the mainstream.
Arguably, the party would remain outside the mainstream until the eventual creation of the
Scottish Parliament (Hassan, Ed, 2009). Prior to the formal devolution of a few powers, the SNP
were not seen as a potential governing party but rather a fringe, protest party. Their credibility
had been damaged by bringing down the Labour government and this further cemented them
outside of the political establishment. The support for the SNP was spread wide across the
country, but the support was not strong enough to make a strong impression at Westminster yet.
The party had positioned itself as fundamentally anti-tory because of their role in the antiConservative Labour government. The SNP were isolated from both the right and the left.
Although I argue that the SNP is in many ways completely unique, they are in other ways
very similar to the way other British political parties function. For instance, there are of course
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internal disagreements that lead to the eruption of tension among party members. In the case of
the SNP, it seems obvious that the biggest division between members is referring to the core goal
of the party – how to attain independence. There were the gradualists and fundamentalists but
also within the party, there were various political opinions. Some were right-wingers like the
Conservatives but with the desire for independence. On the other hand, there were left-wingers
like Alex Salmond that wanted to drag the party to the left and build on the agenda that had been
crafted in the 60s. In addition, there were those within the SNP that didn’t want to be politically
affiliated at all, as this would alienate their desperately needed voter base.
As mentioned in the prior chapter, the SNP didn’t have the formal leader office initially
as other UK parties did. During this second level of development, the SNP began to be more
organized more centrally and with a more formal policy platform. Once Alex Salmond was
allowed back into the party, the SNP finally had the charismatic leader they needed to craft a
cohesive message and begin to take on the Westminster elections with a serious strategy. The
1970s were instrumental in the SNP’s development of their ideology but not for their party
strategy.
The changes occurring in Scotland were not just political. The traditional party-religion
relationship was beginning to disintegrate (Johns & Mitchell, 2016). It was this new sociological
trend that transformed the Scottish political context. Scottish politics had closely resembled
politics across the rest of the UK. It had previously just been Labour vs. the Conservatives with
one’s political affiliation being closely tied to one’s social class. In addition, the tie between
party and religion began to slowly disintegrate. The SNP were instrumental in this new social
change in Scotland. The SNP highlighted that Scotland had a very different set of political
priorities that were not being addressed at Westminster.
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On the Rise Again
The 1983 election was a wakeup call for both the Scottish National Party and the Labour
Party. Both parties realized that they needed to pay more attention to the electorate and the
policies they wanted (Bennie et al, 1997), not just the traditional policies of the party. The SNP’s
party platform evolved with regard to the European Economic Community (EC) and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The SNP gradually began to support these organizations,
especially the EC. In addition to their transitioning policy platform, the shadow of the 79 Group
dominated the party agenda. The expulsion of the group was changed to just a suspension and
the members of the group were eventually allowed back into the party (Mitchell et al, 2012).
In the 1983 election, the SNP were able to hold the two Westminster seats that they had
been left with following the 1979 decline (Mitchell et al, 2012). Unfortunately, the party support
was still dwindling. The internal, public fighting within the party continued to prevent the party
from focusing their attention on Westminster. The 1987 election was not much better. The SNP
lost the two seats they had managed to defend in 1983 but they were able to gain three more in
other areas. This general election performance highlighted a key weakness and strength for the
SNP. The party enjoyed widespread support across Scotland, but the support was not dense
enough in areas to translate this support into seats at Westminster. The support was too thinly
spread to make a mark on British politics, but this would slowly change as the 20th century came
to a close.
During the 1980s, the SNP’s party manifestos became steadily larger as the left of center
agenda became more cemented within the party. Gordon Wilson, party chairman at the time,
attempted to move the party further to the center in an attempt to increase credibility toward the
electorate. This began with an attempt to begin to remedy the division within the party regarding
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devolution. In 1984, the SNP held its party conference and finally adopted a more pragmatic
approach to devolution and finally launched a formal campaign for a formal Scottish assembly
(Lynch, 2013). The SNP began to focus on the electorate, as did Labour, but the true catalyst that
brought the SNP back to relevance, was the incoming Conservative government.
The Arrival of Margaret Thatcher
If you talk to a Scot who is well-versed in the history of Scottish politics, they might tell
you that Margaret Thatcher was the single largest factor that contributed to an increase in
independence fervor. It was her treatment of the Scots that enabled the SNP to move from a
fringe party to a party of protest on behalf of the Scottish voters. The SNP had been instrumental
in the arrival of Thatcher following the collapse of the Labour minority government. Margaret
Thatcher became prime minster in 1979 and would lead the Conservatives through three general
elections. She came to power during a time of great economic uncertainty across Britain, with
widespread unemployment and the forthcoming national industrial collapse (Bennie, Brand &
Mitchell, 1997).
What made Thatcher so controversial in Scotland was her apparent disregard for the
social consequences of her policies that were an attempt to remedy the industrial problems in
Britain (Torrance, 2009). To the Scottish public, Thatcher became the great oppressor, with her
brutal handling of the miners’ strike in 1984 and 1985. In addition, Thatcher took the United
Kingdom into the Falklands War which at first, boosted her support across Scotland. However,
this seemed to play right into the hands of the SNP who were against the conflict against
Argentina. Most controversial of all, the infamous poll tax which was a new system of taxation
introduced in Scotland before the rest of the UK. This new taxation system was seen as a means
of using Scotland as an experiment, highlighting Westminster’s distain for the Scottish people.

30

The poll tax replaced the old system which collected taxes at differing rates depending on the
rental value of their property. By getting rid of the scale, Thatcher’s new taxation policy placed a
considerable burden on Scottish families (Torrance, 2009). Despite an outcry in protestation
from the Scottish people, the poll tax continued. In short, the Thatcher government indicated that
Scotland needed an alternative to Westminster.
In the Thatcher era, it became clear that the SNP had made the right call to decide to be a
left of center party. The Conservative government was incredibly unpopular in Scotland and
began to fuel the belief that Westminster had no business trying to govern Scotland (Bennie et al,
1997). There were those that insisted the Conservatives had no mandate to govern in Scotland
(Lynch, 2013). The true challenge for the SNP was the need to repair the relationship between
themselves and Labour voters as many held them responsible for ending the Labour government.
I argue that Thatcher was the spark that the SNP needed to reignite its strategy against the UK
political establishment. In the 60s and 70s, the SNP had seemed to accept that the stage for them
was at Westminster. However, this changed following Thatcher’s eleven years as Prime
Minister.
By 1987, Thatcher’s treatment of Scotland had re-opened the constitutional question of
whether Scotland could stand to be governed by an out of touch Westminster. This re-fueled the
debate on whether Scotland needed its own parliament. Furthermore, the SNP had established a
more practical approach to devolution, so the stage was set for a 2nd referendum on the subject.
Meanwhile, the SNP had become a legitimate party speaking out for the Scottish electorate’s
interests. The Labour vs. Conservative system was beginning to break down following the eleven
years of Conservative dominance and the Labour party appeared to be an incompetent mess of a
political party, with Britain’s industrial backbone beginning to break.
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In the general election of 1987, the SNP joined forces with the Labour party in an attempt
to put an end to the Tory government. This sparked a new trend within the Scottish electorate as
they began engaging in tactical voting as a means of bringing down the party in power (Pittock,
2015). The combined power of the SNP and Labour did major damage to the Conservatives, as
they lost more than half of their seats in Scotland. Furthermore, Scottish voters supplied Labour
with about a quarter of their seats, highlighting that for the Labour party to do well, they relied
on Scottish votes. Further down the line, the eventual rise of the SNP’s credibility would
dramatically damage the Labour party’s ability to form a Westminster government. But for now,
the SNP had aided the Labour party in taking back some credibility from the Tories, thus
beginning the direct competition between Labour and the SNP.
Chapter 4: The Promising Decade
Alex Salmond’s Return
Following his removal from the SNP as a result of his membership of the 79 Group,
Alex Salmond returned to the party. After being allowed back into the SNP, he had taken on the
role of Vice-Convener for Publicity and then in 1987, he stood for election and became a
Member of Parliament at Westminster. Furthermore, he was able to ride back into favor on the
back of Scotland’s distain for the Thatcher government, especially their hate for the poll tax
(Mitchell et al, 2012). The 1990s became known as “the Salmond decade” (Lynch, 2013).
Salmond was the figure that the SNP had been lacking since its creation. He became the everpresent face of the Scottish National Party, even the independence movement. His “personality,
media performance and work ethic” was able to “propel the SNP to new prominence” (Lynch,
2013). After the party’s identity crisis in the 1980s, Salmond brought much needed energy to the
party that would slowly develop the party’s social justice platform and push it into its third and
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final stage of development – a governing, mainstream political party.
After 1979, Gordon Wilson, the party chairman, called for the creation of a Commission
of Inquiry into the party organization. The findings were published in 1985 and highlighted the
poor management of the party. For instance, the party had continued to rely on party membership
as its financial base. Furthermore, the party had “become too bureaucratic, too introspective and
too conservative” (Hassan and Warhurst, Eds, 2000). To remedy this, the party slowly began to
re-organize and become more centralized which culminated in the creation of the office of party
leader. This re-organization was paramount to the SNP’s continued development. The 1970s and
1980s were dominated with internal party fighting and internal factions, such as the 79 group.
Now, the party was beginning to realize that in order for the party to regain and grow its support,
the party would need to get its act together and unify.
In 1990, Salmond stood in the election for the SNP’s new party leader. The leadership
election came as a result of Gordon Wilson, the party’s chairman and leader since 1979, decided
to step down. The contest was between Alex Salmond and Margaret Ewing (daughter in law to
Winnie Ewing). Although Salmond was not the favorite to win the leadership contest, he was
able to secure victory on account of his large amounts of policy ideas and strategies. He further
built on his gradualist approach he had held since the 1970s and decided to pursue devolution as
a step toward independence. Eventually, the gradualist approach was able to win out and become
the dominant mindset for the SNP. However, Gordon Wilson had been able to begin to heal the
division between gradualists and fundamentalists and this was continued upon the arrival of Alex
Salmond. His first big move as leader was to once again, endorse the campaign for Scottish
devolution.
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Devolution, Again.
The Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, George Robertson, said in the 1990s that he
believed “devolution would kill Nationalism stone dead” (Hassan, Ed, 1997). However, it soon
became apparent that devolution would have the opposite effect. Rather than destroying the
SNP’s key issue, it seemed to fuel the desire for Scotland to have further autonomy. I argue that
the 1979 devolution referendum came too soon for the SNP to adopt a standard, collective
approach to the policy issue. However, by 1997, the party had spent twenty years internally
debating the practicality of devolution and were ready to take a concrete stance.
There were very high stakes for the 1997 devolution referendum. The 1979 failure could
not happen again. Despite this defeat in 1979, the policy of devolution did not vanish, though it
was ignored during the Conservative Thatcher and Major governments. Interestingly, in both
1979 and 1997, it was a Labour government with a majority. A factor that had further fueled
Scotland’s distain for Thatcherism was her insistence that devolution not be put into place. On
the other hand, the Labour party seemed much more open to the idea of allowing devolution in
Scotland and Wales to take place. After Margaret Thatcher was ousted as prime minister, she
was succeeded by John Major, who led the Conservatives to yet another victory in Westminster.
This prompted the Labour party to re-visit the issue of devolution in an attempt to attract further
support from the Scots (and in addition, steal support from the SNP). John Smith, the Labour
leader from 1992 to 1994, promised to deliver another devolution referendum. Prior to the
devolution referendum, John Smith passed away, which left it to his successor to carry through
on the promise.
The next Labour leader was Tony Blair, though it had been a close contest between him
and Gordon Brown, another high level Labour party member, who was Scottish. During Smith’s
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time as Labour leader, he had steered the party in the same way as previous traditional, left-wing
Labour politicians had for decades. Both Blair and Brown were modernists who wanted instead
to move the party to the center. Both men were left to decide what their position on Scotland
would be. In an attempt to steal support from Brown, Blair promised to carry forward the
devolution referendum and this carried him to a victory and the Labour party were finally able to
return to power after four general election losses.
The creation of a second devolution referendum was one of the first post-election
promises fulfilled by Labour when they came to power in May 1997. The Scottish electorate
were asked to answer yes or no to two statements: 1. I agree there should be a Scottish
Parliament. 2. I agree that a Scottish Parliament should have tax-verifying powers. The turnout
was much stronger for this devolution referendum with 60.43% turnout (Dewdney, 1997). The
response to the first question of whether or not there should be a Scottish parliament was met
with a positive response, with 74.29% of voters answering yes. Regarding the second question,
63.48% of the electorate asserted that they believed parliament should have taxation powers.
These results were enough to begin a policy of devolution. The 1998 Scotland Act was passed by
the UK parliament, thus creating a formal Scottish parliament and the parliament convened for
the first time in May 1999.
Devolution was arguably essential for the SNP. If the 2nd referendum had been a failure,
the SNP would have risked a quick death at the hands of the Scottish voters, as they reverted
back to either Labour or the Tories. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, it was evident that although
the SNP were gaining popularity, there were unable to transform this support into tangible
parliamentary seats. This was the result of the First Past the Post system acting as a road block.
The SNP support remained thinly spread across Scotland and therefore, they had little chance of
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ever having significant representation at Westminster. With the creation of the new, distinctly
Scottish venue, the SNP were one step closer to their goal of full independence. In addition, as
previously discussed, the party had the serious issue of party infighting on various policy issues,
predominantly the policy of devolution.
The Creation of the Scottish Parliament
The creation of Holyrood gave the SNP a whole other venue to gain support from the
Scottish electorate and prove itself as a credible, governing party. It has been asserted that
contemporary Scottish politics began with the first Scottish parliamentary election in 1999
(Hassan, Ed, 2009). The SNP continued to develop their agenda; in the 1980s, the party asserted
their commitment to gain independence but stay within Europe and the economic union. By
becoming a left-leaning, pro-EU party, the SNP were beginning to market themselves to the
Scottish people. The Thatcher government had therefore added fuel to the SNP, as the poll-tax
and Tory policies continued to highlight the different political leanings in Scotland vs. the rest of
the UK. The Labour party under Tony Blair decided to move towards the center, thus leaving the
vacuum open for left-leaning voters to turn to the SNP for representation.
The internal fighting between the fundamentalists and gradualists seemed to have
diminished enough to allow the SNP to become an electable force once again. Salmond had
instilled a pragmatic, gradualist attitude towards independence. Although it must be noted that
independence never left the SNP’s party platform. Instead, Salmond wanted to take full
advantage of Holyrood as a means of showcasing the need that Scotland had for more autonomy
from Westminster. To do this, the party made the decision that all SNP MPs would participate in
the first round of the Scottish parliament elections. This was an advantage because it meant that
the SNP had some experienced parliamentarians competing (Hassan, 2009). On the other hand, it
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meant that the SNP MPs were being forced to split their time between Westminster and Scotland.
What now for Scottish politics?
Up until this period, Scottish politics had been dominated by the Labour for the most
part. However, with the slow progress made by Alex Salmond, there was now a party that could
credibly challenge Labour’s dominance (Hassan and Warhurst, Ed, 2000). Salmond began the
process of professionalization within the party. There was much debate on how Scottish politics
would evolve because of the creation of a Scottish legislature. There seemed to be three main
possibilities. Firstly, Labour could continue to dominate in Holyrood as they had in Westminster
but with a slightly more competitive atmosphere with the SNP. Secondly, Labour and the SNP
could enter into a two-party system with the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives present but
with a diminished voice. Thirdly, a more pluralistic system could set in, with no two parties
being able to dominate the parliament; there would also be smaller forces entering the arena,
such as the Scottish Green Party or the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP). The third possibility
seemed to most closely reflect the way parliamentary politics worked in continental Europe, with
four mainstream parties and other parties on the outskirts.
Although initially Labour did dominate, the balance shifted slowly in favor of the
Scottish National Party. The 80s proved to be an incredibly important basis on which the SNP
were able to adopt more policy positions and arguably, hit rock bottom so that they could rebuild. The 1980s had transformed from just a populist, independence party to a social democratic
protest party in response to Thatcherism. To complete the transformation, the SNP had to
become “a party with a defined set of core beliefs beyond independence” (Hassan and Warhurst,
Eds, 2000). The creation of this new venue for Scotland finally seemed to put the SNP and the
Labour party squarely against one another, a rivalry that had slowly been building for several
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decades.
The other British political parties, specifically the Scottish branches of the Conservatives
and the Labour party, were attempting to adapt their policy positions in order to succeed in the
Holyrood parliament. The SNP had the advantage because they were founded in Scotland and
had built a name for themselves at the grassroots level since the 1970s. The other parties had to
face the challenge of just being more of the same policies from their Westminster counterparts.
The elections in the Scottish parliament ran in between the elections at Westminster, meaning
that the campaigns for Holyrood had a very Scottish atmosphere around them (Hassan, Ed,
2009). However, the SNP had to attempt to break the generations-old political alliances that had
been connected to social standing or even religion. The SNP approached the challenge with great
energy as always.
Westminster vs. Holyrood
The first Holyrood election was vital for the SNP. Salmond led the party on his social
justice platform, with the main policy of ‘A Penny for Scotland’. This program was the first of
the SNP’s continuing diversion from the Westminster status-quo. In the rest of the United
Kingdom, the Labour government had proposed a 1p tax cut. However, the SNP created this
policy and said that instead of allowing Scots to have this tax cut, they would maintain the
current rate and use the money raised to improve Scotland’s public services. The party was also
met with the challenge of dealing with a hostile reception from Britain’s media. For instance, the
SNP’s party manifesto was ripped apart and criticized far more than the other parties. The party
was not yet part of the establishment and was therefore, met with for more criticism than was
warranted. In spite of this, the election ended up being the best result the SNP had ever managed
to muster, especially with regards to seat numbers (Hassan, Ed, 2009). The party managed to get
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35 MSPs elected and had finally become an electoral force. The Labour party won the election
with 56 seats and entered into a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Although it was not an allout victory for the SNP, it was a necessary step towards credibility.
Up until now, it may seem that the creation of the Scottish parliament was only
advantageous for the SNP. However, it also threatened to make the party irrelevant. As
previously mentioned, the SNP decided to have its MPS run in the first round of Scottish
parliament elections. Although this ensured experienced SNP politicians would be present at
Holyrood, it also threatened to diminish the need for them at Westminster. The SNP’s opponents
began to argue that now there was an actual Scottish parliament, the SNP were no longer a
legitimate party in Westminster and that a vote for them was a waste (Hassan, Ed, 2009). Even in
the 1970s, the SNP had developed enough of a presence to bring down the Labour government in
1979. The party now risked losing this perceived power. To remedy the situation, Alex Salmond
decided to step down from being the SNP’s leader in Holyrood and decided to continue just as an
MP in Westminster. By continuing as an MP, the SNP would have a popular and well-known
face leading them in Westminster which would hopefully diminish the belief that they were
becoming irrelevant.
Alex Salmond’s charisma and personality were beneficial when it came to building a
name for himself at Westminster. He became the SNP’s spokesman on Foreign Affairs,
highlighting the fact the SNP could see beyond Scottish affairs. Some members of the SNP
suggested that the SNP should take a step back from Westminster and focus their attention on
Holyrood since they had campaigned so hard for a devolved administration (Hassan, Ed, 2009).
However, the SNP never really withdrew from Westminster. Rather, they began to build a role
for themselves as a small bloc that worked to protect Scottish interests as well as hold the
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government to account on issues they deemed necessary. An example of this was when an SNP
MP from the Western Isles drew attention to the common practice of cash for peerages (Hassan,
Ed, 2009). By acting as a pressure group, the SNP’s small group of Westminster MPs with Alex
Salmond leading them, the SNP showed the electorate that they had real governing potential.
The role of media became a vital aspect of the professionalization of the SNP. In order to
afford media coverage in the TV age, the party applied a professional approach to fundraising.
Ales Salmond supervised the creation of an internal party newsletter beginning in 1990 and was
a way for the party to directly ask party members for monthly donations (Lynch, 2002). The
money from these donations were then used to invest in new technology, mailers and marketing.
New communication and support staff were hired who they handled party TV broadcasts, call
enters as well as candidate-training (Lynch, 2013). Alex Salmond went even further by creating
the ‘Convenor’s Club’, meaning a way in which they could raise money from donors who
wished to attend special events or dinners with Salmond. These efforts gave the party more funds
to utilize in the Westminster elections of the 90s.
The SNP now had the party organization strategy that they had lacked in the 60s and 70s.
The party was beginning to build on the financial difficulties that had preyed on the party since
the beginning. In addition, the party was beginning to resemble the typical British political party,
with a formal leader acting as the face of the party but with a party machine operating under the
leader. The party now had a formal policy platform that they could use as their base. Alex
Salmond was able to prove that there was more to the party than independence. For instance,
during his time as Foreign Affairs spokesman for the party, Alex Salmond came out strongly
against the UK being complicit in the 1999 NATO bombing in Serbia. Salmond pointed out that
the bombing had not be approved by the United Nations Security Council and was therefore, a
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huge mistake. Once again, Salmond’s media presence was working to the advantage of the SNP
as more voters took notice of the party at Westminster.
Nationalism was becoming a tangible political force in Scottish politics. The SNP had
seized their second chance at a devolved administration and had won. They had a new, highprofile leader who had guided them away from the chaos of the 80s and molded them into an
electable force, with two legislative arenas to work in. Despite fears that the SNP would retreat
back to Scotland where they belonged, Alex Salmond had maintained the SNP’s relevance by
becoming a pressure group that held the UK political parties to account. The new millennium
looked bright for the SNP as they turned their attention to dominating in Holyrood and making
an even bigger name for themselves at Westminster.
Chapter 5: Entering Government
Following the stepping down of Alex Salmond as leader, there was a vacuum at the top
of the SNP’s party leadership. This gap was filled by John Swinney in September 2000 at the
party’s annual conference (Hassan, Ed, 2009). Following the 1999 seat increase in the Scottish
parliament, the party was still ill at ease with its new role in the two political venues of
Westminster and Holyrood. John Swinney was faced with the challenge of helping push the
party through this period of turmoil. From 1999 to 2003, there appeared to be a resurgence in the
age-old gradualist vs. fundamentalist approaches which Swinney had to deal with. In addition,
Swinney and Salmond had very different personality styles. Swinney had less bombastic
charisma but had a quiet confidence that could be just as effective. Unfortunately, SNP MSPs
nearly constantly called on Salmond to return from Westminster to take back the Holyrood
leadership position. This once again highlights that challenge that devolution posed for the party
as they struggled to split their time evenly.
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Swinney had to deal with the SNP’s “teething problems” as it struggled to act as the
opposition party to Labour. For instance, he brought in the policy of ‘one member, one vote’
when it comes to electing new party leadership. In addition, he centralized the membership list
so that the party’s professional staff could improve fundraising and communication (Hassan, Ed,
2009). Swinney’s four-year leadership was riddled with internal fights between members, but the
organizational development of the party was necessary. He had to deal with the aftermath of
Salmond and attempted to keep the momentum going whilst mitigating party conflict. The party
also began to immerse itself in parliamentary business despite the tumultuous Swinney period.
MSP’s sponsored and wrote bills on public service improvements such as banning hunting with
dogs and banning smoking in public places (Hassan, Ed, 2009). However, the party still
struggled with feeling directionless and in flux.
The SNP had to get back to its core mission and begin furthering the case for
independence once again. Alex Salmond, who worked for both the Royal Bank of Scotland and
the Scottish Office as an economist, was particularly insistent on building an economic argument
for independence (Lynch, 2013). To do this, Salmond began looking at what an independent
Scotland would actually look like in terms of taxation, public spending and government
programs. It was imperative that the SNP begin challenging the other UK parties that were
insisting the costs of independence far outweighed the advantages. In order to do this, the SNP
began publishing reports on budgeting and the way in which an independent Scotland could
function. Other political parties attempted to undermine the SNP’s efforts by insisting that
Scotland was dependent on the UK. The Conservative party were especially insistent that there
was no economic case for independence on account of the fact that Scotland received more
public expenditure than the country brought in in taxes (Lynch, 2013). Therefore, the
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Conservatives argued that Scotland was better off in the status-quo on account of their strong
economic position already.
This left the SNP in a challenging position as they had to persuade the Scottish people to
believe in independence as well as agree with the practical implications of leaving the UK. The
Conservatives insisted that if Scotland wanted to maintain the current amount of public spending
they were enjoying prior to independence, then Scotland would have to raise taxes to meet it
(Lynch, 2013). The SNP under Salmond were faced with the difficult task of attempting to
publish reports and statistics on the Scottish economy that were isolated from the rest of the UK.
It proved to be incredibly difficult to remove Scottish economic numbers from the rest of the
United Kingdoms. The economic argument linked back to the campaign launched in the 1970s
and 80s following the discovery of oil in the North Sea. The economic argument became tied to
oil very quickly as Scotland’s claim to the oil gave the SNP the means in which Scotland could
have an independent economy.
Furthermore, the issue of independence was not just a case of economics. It was a
political and cultural debate that had yet to gain steam. The economic argument, although
important, was not the issue to be focused on by the SNP. The economic argument was
incredibly hypothetical; after all, no one could be certain about what would truly happen after
independence. The 1990s and early 2000s was a period characterized as a modernization period.
As mentioned previously, the party fundraising abilities were steadily improving (Lynch, 2013).
In 1994, the party appointed its own economist to produce economic reports on independence.
The party continued to modernize and become more mainstream by developing the way
in which it treated the electorate. As mentioned in the earlier discussion of populist parties, it is
typical of nationalist parties to create a divide between its own citizens and those of other
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nationalities (Judis, 2016). The SNP never created such a division. Rather, they embraced the
multinational and multiethnic dimensions of Scotland. This was paramount for the SNP to
transition from a party trying to represent a select group and instead, to represent a wide amount
of the electorate. By distancing themselves from the way in which other populist political parties
operated, the SNP was able to avoid being written off as just a protest party. Instead of pitting
itself against immigrants, the SNP began constructing a dialogue that put itself up against
Westminster as their main opponent.
This is not to say that there weren’t challenges for the SNP. Although the party embraced
Scotland’s multi-cultural identity, not all of their supporters were on board with this. For
instance, the SNP were often held responsible for any anti-English sentiment that arose in
Scotland (Lynch, 2013). In 1992, an anti-English groups emerged, known as the ‘Settler Watch’,
who wanted to prevent English citizens moving into Scotland. This of course did damage to the
reputation of the Scottish National Party as this was exactly what the party had been trying to
avoid by casting a wide net around Scotland’s other cultural groups. Some of the members of
these anti-English groups were in fact SNP members. In response to this, the party expelled those
that were involved in these groups. However, the damage was done, and this damaged the
credibility of the party, just as the party was attempting to become more credible by building the
case for independence. It is evident that the SNP had to overcome considerable obstacles to
become more than a fringe group that wasn’t taken seriously.
In addition to dealing with the issue of legitimacy, the SNP were faced with the challenge
of going beyond independence and entering the mainstream. Following the creation of Holyrood,
the party was faced with attempting to become the governing party, which meant they would
have to defeat Labour. The party also had to balance its attention with Westminster. In 1999, the
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party had to attack the dominance of Labour head on. The ability of the SNP to achieve their
goals had been given a boost following the 1997 referendum. However, stealing support from
Labour proved to be a challenge. After all, it had been a Labour government that had enabled
devolution to finally take place. The party seized the opportunity and attacked Labour with full
force, finally bringing Labour’s attention to the fact that they could no longer ignore the actions
of the SNP if they were to continue being a threat to the Conservatives. In an attempt to kill the
momentum that the SNP was gaining, the Labour party began a campaign to draw the electorates
attention to the dark side of independence.
The new Labour strategy slogan, “divorce is an expensive business” was created as a
means of reminding left-leaning voters that Labour was the safest option (Lynch, 2013. To
combat this, the SNP tried to move away from independence as their sole base but they were
faced with many challenges. Firstly, and most importantly, the 1999 Scottish election was
difficult for the SNP as they had to limit their message to devolved issues. These issues included
education, the environment, health, agriculture, fisheries and local governments (Lynch, 2013).
This left the other large-scale issues for the party at Westminster to address. The SNP was
beginning to take on the strategy that other mainstream parties were using. This gave rise to the
second big challenge for the SNP: devolution vs. independence. It proved difficult for the party
to harmonize their message. The devolved party was attempting to improve Scotland’s domestic
services, but also persuade voters that independence was the best course of action. This led to
them coming up against the Labour party’s campaign of independence being expensive.
As well as the challenge of Labour, the SNP also faced the emergence of other political
parties that attempted to take away their support. The most important of these other parties was
the Scottish Socialist Party (known as the SSP). Arguably, they were at their most influential in
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2003 as they began running candidates in constituencies against SNP candidates. What made
them particularly threatening to the SNP was the geographic areas in which they were
concentrated, such as in Glasgow (Lynch, 2013). The SNP had to deal with both smaller protest
parties as well as the establishment, making progress difficult.
It took almost a decade for the party to be able to push past the roadblock that the Labour
party had put up in an attempt to prevent the SNP from becoming the governing party. It was at
this point that the social-democrat agenda that Salmond had built came into play, as well as John
Swinney’s organizational platform. The party was about to go beyond the “separatist agenda”
that their opponents claimed was their only goal (Lynch, 20013. Devolution had given the SNP
their much-needed local venue to garner support but now they needed to transfer their electoral
support into enough seats to become the governing party. The party would get their chance in
2007.
Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon: A Partnership
Following the stepping down of John Swinney in 2004, the SNP was once again in need
of a leader. Party members were faced with a choice of either Nicola Sturgeon or Roseanna
Cunningham. Just as there had been during the Swinney leadership, there were continued calls
for Alex Salmond to return from Westminster. Nicola Sturgeon had been Salmond’s pick but
eventually facing increased pressure at the prospect of Cunningham winning the leadership,
Salmond decided to run for the leadership. Salmond and Sturgeon met, with Sturgeon agreeing to
step aside and serve as Deputy Leader. Salmond won easily with 76% of the vote (Hassan, Ed,
2009). However, Salmond still remained an MP at Westminster since he had given up his role at
Holyrood in 1999. This led to a new dynamic with Sturgeon acting as the face of the party in
Edinburgh and Holyrood matters and Salmond to finish out his time at Westminster. Nicola

46

Sturgeon immediately showed tenacity and strength in First Ministers Questions as she was able
to hold the Labour party to account (Hassan, Ed, 2009).
Alex Salmond took on the role as leader with a very specific goal in mind – he intended
to be the next First Minister of Scotland in the 2007 Scottish elections. Together, Sturgeon and
Salmond worked alongside the new, much better organized, party staff to target voters to spread
their message. With the Salmons-Sturgeon partnership, Labour party dominance at Holyrood
was finally challenged. There were two contributing reasons for the SNP’s Holyrood
breakthrough. Firstly, the Labour party had been in control of Westminster for a decade and
Holyrood since 1999 alongside a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. The Scottish electorate
were ready for change and the SNP truly embodied this on account of them never being a
governing party before. The Labour party approached the 2007 election with too much
complacency and were unprepared for the challenge that the SNP mounted. Secondly, Labour in
Westminster were struggling to defend the policy decisions they had made regarding Iraq, thus
damaging the credibility in Holyrood as well. Thirdly, Swinney, Salmond and Sturgeon had all
in their own ways improved the standing of the party, whether it was within the party, with the
media or within Holyrood (Hassan & Barrow, Eds, 2017).
It is important to mention that the very design of the Scottish electoral system was
stacked against any party achieving a stand-alone majority. Following the creation of Holyrood,
there had been an agreement that it was better to avoid a system that would lead to a majority
government. To avoid this possibility, the parliament began to use a semi-proportional system
(Lynch, 2013), known as the additional member system. The aim of this system is to encourage
the need for coalitions, rather than allowing just one political party to dominate. Instead, a
coalition or minority government was preferred in order to build consensus (Pike, 2015). In
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practice, this electoral system is comprised of the constituency vote and the regional vote, with
each vote leading to the selection of half of the MSPs. The constituency vote selects the
candidate that will represent one of the seventy-three constituencies, utilizing a First Past the
Post system. This form of voting is centered predominantly on the candidate as well as the
political party. The regional vote relies more on party affiliation as the voter chooses the political
party they wish to represent them and then the seats are assigned proportionally (Scottish
Parliament).
The SNP were able to secure 47 seats in Holyrood, one more than Labour. The party tried
and failed to enter into coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Talks quickly broke down; instead,
Salmond gained the approval of the Scottish Greens, thus adding two MSPs to his cause. The
SNP formed a minority government which proved tricky with regard to passing legislation, but it
functioned well-enough. With Alex Salmond as First Minister of Scotland, he was now in a
position to continue rolling out his gradualist policies, specifically in regard to devolution. The
SNP-run government were not idle; they began to overhaul many different areas of government,
especially in the areas of transport, education and health. For instance, the party got rid of tolls
on the Forth and Tay Bridges, prevented several Accident and Emergency units from closing,
froze the council tax, got rid of university tuition fees and put an end to prescription fees
(Hassan, Ed, 2009).
Although the party turned their attention to governing, the issue of independence was
never far from Salmond’s mind. Right after the 2007 election, he unveiled an Independence
White Paper, with plans to hold a referendum on independence in 2010. It is important to note
that this referendum didn’t necessarily mean independence or nothing. Instead, Salmond
contended that there could be enhanced devolution or more self-government or even just the
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status-quo. This was a pragmatic choice so that it didn’t completely isolate themselves from the
rest of the electorate that weren’t totally sold on independence. Once again, devolution seems to
be the best tool that could have ever been given to the SNP as the party continued to shine as a
governing party at Holyrood and as a pressure group in Westminster. The next logical step was
for the party to hold the referendum of a generation so that the party could finally achieve their
most fundamental goal – an independent Scotland.
Chapter 6: The Referendum of a Generation
Hitting the Ground Running
Unveiling the independence white paper early on in the SNP’s government highlighted
Salmond’s unabashed commitment to holding a democratic vote on independence. As
previously mentioned, the Scottish electoral system had been created with the goal of preventing
a single political party from dominating and instead, coalitions could and would be utilized. The
Labour party had relied on the belief that the SNP would be unable to enter into a coalition with
one of the other parties at Holyrood on account of their stigmatizing commitment to ending the
status quo and creating an independent Scotland. However, in 2007, the SNP had performed
marginally better than Labour and had expected the Liberal Democrats to fall in line and create a
coalition with them (Lynch, 2013). Unfortunately for the SNP, the Liberal Democrats were
unwilling to enter into a coalition with the SNP unless they dropped their commitment for
independence. This was of course completely off the table for Salmond and forced the SNP into
creating a minority government, putting independence on the back burner.
Although the SNP’s victory in 2007 was narrow, it was significant as well as a turning
point. It highlighted that support for Labour was finally beginning to dip. This came as a result of
several factors. Firstly, as mentioned previously, the old order of religion and party affiliation
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was continuing to breakdown. Secondly, the Labour party was also struggling to maintain their
dominance as a result of the Iraq war, with the former wide-spread support for Tony Blair
beginning to dry up (Lynch, 2013). Furthermore, I argue that the Labour party ran a poor
campaign in comparison to that of the SNP; Alex Salmond’s charisma continued to inspire
support and as always, the fact that the SNP only campaigned in Scotland unlike the Labour
party continued to act as an advantage for the SNP.
It was essential that the SNP prove themselves to be capable and more than just a singleissue party. To do this, the party set ambitious targets with regard to economic growth, the
reduction of poverty and the inequality across Scottish society (Hassan, Ed, 2009). Arguably, the
most important of these goals because of its impact on whether independence could be practical
or not. By focusing on social justice issues as well as Scotland’s economic growth allowed the
SNP to begin to further challenge the Labour party. The SNP was beginning to steal issues from
Labour and make tangible improvements, highlighting the false premise that they were incapable
of advocating for anything other than independence.
Despite the slender margin of the SNP’s government, Salmond began working to channel
the SNP’s growing support among the electorate and seize the moment. Although there were
fears that the SNP minority government may struggle to survive, there were also benefits to their
method. For instance, there were no arduous coalition negotiations that prevented them getting to
business and enacting policy change. Furthermore, by being in government, the Scottish National
Party were in a position they had never been in before. I argue that the party had clearly chosen
the most advantageous path by sticking to a gradualist approach to independence. If the party had
adopted a fundamentalist approach, they would have inevitably isolated themselves from the rest
of the electorate and never have managed to compete with Labour. After beginning their
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minority government, Salmond was able to create positive policy change to increase support for
independence within the public. In addition, by having control of Holyrood, the SNP were in a
position to hold a referendum or some such democratic mechanism with a higher degree of
credibility. The next logical step for the SNP was to build on their support s that they could
transition from just being a minority government to holding a majority so that a binding choice
could be made.
In the lead up to the 2011 election, the SNP government published a draft referendum bill
as a means of building more support from other parties in Holyrood, specifically the Liberal
Democrats. The aim was to make the prospect of a coalition with the SNP more attractive
(Lynch, 2013). The bill offered two options. Firstly, there was the option of devo-max, meaning
further issues would be devolved from Westminster to Holyrood. Secondly, there was the option
of holding an independence referendum (Lynch, 2013). Although nothing seemed to come of the
bill, it did indicate that the SNP were willing to compromise if it meant they would be able to
end their time as a minority government.
The Scottish National Party also had to continue to maintain their presence in
Westminster. This became increasingly difficult as the SNP was now a governing party that had
to focus much of their attention on Holyrood. Moreover, the party had lost their charismatic
leader in the form of Alex Salmond as he had decided to resume his role as First Minister. This
had left a vacuum that desperately needed to be filled if the SNP wanted to continue with its role
of challenging the Westminster-based UK political establishment. This was exactly what the
advocates of devolution at Westminster had been hoping – that the SNP would fade into
obscurity in Westminster and retreat north to Holyrood. This didn’t end up being the case.
However, there was a dip in SNP performance for several reasons. Firstly, and predominately,
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there was the split in SNP attention as a result of devolution. Secondly, the Liberal Democrats
had risen to prominence as the third party of choice for many in the UK electorate (Lynch, 2013)
which damaged the SNP’s chances. Thirdly, the SNP continued to struggle to find their role in
Westminster as they were consistently faced with the disadvantage of only competing in 59 of
the 650 MP seats, which constantly kept them from making real progress in Westminster.
Salmond skillfully managed to keep the SNP relevant by suggesting an alternative to the
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition that was taking shape. Instead, he proposed what came
to be known as the “progressive coalition” which would be comprised of the Labour party, the
Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party (Lynch, 2013). This was the first time that
since the SNP had brought down the Labour government in 1979 that the SNP were viewed in
this powerful light. It also signified a possible unification of the three pro-devolution parties
against the Conservatives. Moreover, this truly signified that the SNP were on the cusp of
becoming a viable third party, even in Westminster, as they could hold the key to forming a
coalition and bringing down governments. Of course, looking back to 2010, the progressive
coalition never came into existence. Instead, the Liberal Democrats united with the Conservative
party which gave the Tories the majority they needed.
The belief that the additional member system, the electoral system utilized at Holyrood,
would prevent a single party from being able to dominate Holyrood was proved false in 2011.
Salmond’s progressive and social justice-oriented government policy paid off and contributed to
the SNP winning a staggering 69 of the 129 available MSP seats, giving them the margin needed
to form a majority government (Fig 6.1). The SNP skillfully ran a campaign that appealed to the
voters by referring to its competent record during their first term in government. Furthermore,
the SNP chipped a large amount of support away from Labour as well as the Liberal Democrats
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(Lynch, 2013). The majority result meant that the SNP were no longer at the mercy of the other
parties in Holyrood in the hope that they would support their policies. Rather, they had been
handed a mandate from the Scottish people as they entered their third stage of development, the
legitimate governing party stage.

Figure 6.1 Scottish Parliamentary results 2011
The 2011 results were the most damaging for Scottish Labour. They were seen as the
establishment party in Scotland and in addition, were the party that had allowed devolution to
begin in the first place (Pike, 2015). The Labour party suffered their worst defeat since 1931.
Furthermore, this turn of events had not been predicted. The complete disintegration of Labour in
Scotland finally began to turn heads in Westminster, especially to the Conservative-Liberal
Democrat coalition. The SNP were now finally in a position to put a referendum on the table and
Westminster were now realizing that it was likely to happen, not just a pipe dream.
Salmond’s Big Chance
The Scottish National Party had proved to the Scottish electorate that they were a
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competent governing party that could go beyond independence. Now was the time for Alex
Salmond to ride the tide of strong support and seize the chance to negotiate a referendum.
Simply having a majority in Holyrood wasn’t enough. Devolution and the creation of a Scottish
parliament had been granted by Westminster and therefore, holding a referendum would have to
be approved by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. Following a series of negotiations,
the Edinburgh Agreement of 2012 was agreed, which set about the preconditions and
requirements for a referendum on independence to take place. It dictated that the referendum
would be legislated by the Scottish parliament and in turn, deliver a decisive expression of the
views of the Scottish people and a result that everyone will respect (Edinburgh Agreement,
2012). It was agreed that the referendum would take place toward the end of 2014.
David Cameron had been forced into a difficult position following the 2011 Holyrood
election as the SNP finally had the support needed to form a majority government. Different
strategies were considered. For instance, Cameron discussed with his cabinet the possibility of
declaring that any referendum would be illegal, a similar strategy utilized by the Spanish
government regarding Catalonia in 2017. This was ruled out immediately as it would play further
into the SNP’s hands and in turn, make secession inevitable (Pike, 2015). The consensus was that
the UK government had to work proactively with the Scottish government and not give the SNP
a “blank check” to determine the terms of the referendum. Instead, Cameron went along with the
Edinburgh Agreement with the hope that the momentum for independence would evaporate
before September 2014. In the months following the signing of the Edinburgh Agreement, the
details for the referendum were worked out. The Scottish people would be asked the question
‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ (Pike, 2015). In addition, it was agreed that
sixteen and seventeen-year olds would be allowed to vote in the referendum. To ensure equity, a
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spending limit for both campaigns was agreed at £1.5 million.
The 30-month referendum campaign, which was the longest in Scotland’s political
history (Macwhirter, 2014) began in 2012 and it heated up immediately. The two campaigns
were formed early in 2012, with the pro-independence ‘Yes Scotland’ and the pro-union ‘Better
Together’ each comprising the various political parties. ‘Yes Scotland’ was made up of the SNP,
the Scottish Socialists and the Scottish Greens’, but effectively led by Alex Salmond; ‘Better
Together’ was made up of the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, effectively the
political establishment. The pro-union side was led by Alistair Darling, who had been Chancellor
of the Exchequer during the 2008 financial crisis for the Labour government. It is also important
to note that Darling was a senior MP based in Scotland and therefore had strong unionist ties.
The ‘Yes Scotland’ side made sure that there was a strong sense of ownership as the referendum
unfolded. This wasn’t just an ordinary general election with manifesto promises being discussed;
this was a once in a generation decision to alter the course of both Scotland and the entire United
Kingdom.
Both campaigns had their own set of challenges to address. For the ‘Yes Scotland’ side,
their biggest challenge was to dismantle the negative perceptions that much of the Scottish
electorate held regarding independence. They attempted to remedy this by creating a dynamic
campaign which involved including an array of issues and groups. The SNP were also faced with
the specific policy issues that needed to be addressed and planned for in the case of a ‘yes’ vote.
For instance, the electorate demanded to know what the Scottish government would do about
currency, a border between Scotland and the rest of the UK and the issue of European Union
Membership. These contentious issues threatened to divide the campaign as the senior SNP
figures attempted to provide a united response. As well as that, the SNP had to reassure voters
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that they had contingencies and solid strategies for addressing these policy challenges if
independence was achieved.
The SNP-led Scottish government published ‘Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an
Independent Scotland’ in November 2013. It cost £1.2 million to print and distribute the
document (Pike, 2015) with the goal being to get rid of the unknowns of Scottish independence.
Although the white paper outlined the policy goals of an independent Scotland over 670 pages, it
poorly laid out the financial costs. This flaw was a blessing for the ‘Better Together’ campaign
as they immediately attacked the lack of detail in the white paper. Although the white paper
lacked the financial detail, it provided extensive background on the policy issues that were the
priority for the SNP. For instance, the white paper insisted that Scotland’s taxes would no longer
have to pay for the UK’s nuclear weapons program, known as Trident, and would send all
nuclear weapons across the border. Perhaps most important of all was the timeline that was set
out in the event of a ‘Yes’ vote. On September 18th, 2014, the Scottish people were expected to
vote ‘yes’ and this would lead to the commencement of negotiations between the Scottish
government and the UK, EU and other international partners, with the goal of Scotland leaving
the UK by March 2016 (Scottish Government, 2013). Furthermore, the first election would be
held May 6th 2016. Unfortunately, these plans were not taken seriously on account of the lack of
financial backing for their assertions. This mistake by the SNP and the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign
fundamentally damaged their credibility and gave fuel to their opponents.
For the ‘Better Together’ side, they were stuck trying to compete with the energetic and
dynamic campaign that the SNP had created. They were stuck with the less enticing and
persuasive message of simply defending the status-quo. The real turning point during the
campaign came in the form of the currency union. Salmond and the rest of the Scottish
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government continued to insist that an independent Scotland would be able to continue using the
British pound. However, the ‘Better Together’ campaign insisted that this would not be the case.
It became a stare down between the two campaigns as both sides attempted to discredit the other
and come across as the most honest.
The economic argument was the biggest part of the ‘Better Together’ campaign. Despite
the protestations of the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign, the unionist side insisted that there could be no
negotiations on this point. This decision effectively revealed that the union of states that
comprise the United Kingdom was disintegrating. This meant that the relationship between
Scotland and the rest of the UK was no longer a partnership of equals (Macwhirter, 2014), rather
they were trying to bully the Scottish people into remaining in the UK out of fear. Rather than
allowing Scotland to leave the UK through a democratic decision, Westminster would rather see
the Scottish economy riddled with uncertainty on account of their refusal to continue a currency
union.
I argue that the way the UK establishment handled the referendum was incredibly poor
and further isolated the SNP and increased the perception that the pro-independence campaign
was unfairly treated, both by the established parties and the media, although the British
newspapers were overwhelmingly pro-unionist. Throughout the campaign, there was a constant
flow of negative press attacking the pro-independence side, calling them “nationalist thugs”
(Macwhirter, 2014). A further problem with the way the media handled the independence
referendum was their decision to allocate coverage based on the old party affiliations. Rather
than giving equal coverage to the SNP and other Holyrood-based parties such as the Scottish
Greens, the BBC and other networks focused on the Westminster parties, specifically Labour and
the Conservatives (Macwhirter, 2014). As a result, the Scottish electorate were constantly
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bombarded with headlines warning of the risks of independence but never of the benefits. The
entire pro-union campaign came to be known as ‘Project Fear’ because of the constant
accusations of scare-mongering from the ‘Yes Scotland’ side (Pike, 2015). The ‘Better Together’
campaign were consistently accused of this because almost all of their messages were negative in
nature.
The SNP utilized the strategies they had learned over the course of their rise from a
single-issue party to a credible third party. They mobilized their impressive electoral force as
well as the Scottish civil service in an attempt to compete with the pro-unionist messages that
were coming from the ‘Better Together’ side. For instance, the SNP targeted old Labour
strongholds; Labour had considered these safe voters due to voter apathy and disengagement
because of the demographics of the area, such as elderly or poorer voters (Macwhirter, 2014). In
addition, both campaigns took part in televised debates in the final few months of the campaign.
In August, Alistair Darling and Alex Salmond took part in two debates, which were viewed by
an average of 765,000 people throughout the two-hour long broadcast (BBC, 2014). In the lead
up to the first debate, it was expected that Salmond would easily defeat Darling; however, it soon
became clear that this was a premature assertion. Darling skillfully pointed out that without a
back-up plan for the currency union, Salmond and the rest of the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign were
in a staggeringly poor position. Salmond struggled to get past this point and in the end, a poll
showed that 56% of viewers believed that Darling had beaten Salmond (Pike, 2015). During the
second one, which took place two weeks later, Salmond’s performance was much improved as
he discussed the various policies that were being imposed on Scotland by Westminster, such as
childcare and welfare reforms and insisting that an independent Scotland could impose better
policies. Arguably, the actual policies were Salmond’s strong point whereas the economic
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backbone was not, which had led to his poor performance in the first debate. However, the
second one was a much stronger showing for Salmond, with 71% to 29% insisting that Salmond
had won (Pike, 2015). Darling’s first debate performance was a coup for the ‘Better Together’
side, as the economic repercussions of independence struck the electorate.
However, between the August TV debates and the September vote, the support for
‘Better Together’ crashed. With six weeks to go, there had been a twenty-two-point lead for the
‘Better Together’ campaign but this evaporated as the referendum got closer (Pike, 2015). There
are many speculations as to why the tables turned for the ‘Better Together’ campaign. I argue
that the Scottish people grew tired of the ‘Better Together’ campaign consistently trying to
simplify a dynamic and complicated campaign into one single issue – the pound. The SNP
government had begun the debate on independence since 2011 when it won a majority. In
addition, they had run a dynamic and passionate campaign whilst reaching out to every possible
demographic. Both ‘Better Together’ and the British media had tried to treat the referendum just
like any other general election when this simply wasn’t the case. With the economic argument no
longer holding weight, the ‘Better Together’ campaign had no more cards to play. They hadn’t
come up with any alternative policies to rest their case on, nor had they ran a campaign based on
the merits of the union, only the possible failings that would happen in the event of a ‘yes’ vote.
This left the UK political establishment in shock as ‘Yes Scotland’ support began to build, with
only weeks to turn the tide.
As the tide seemed to turn in favor of a yes vote, Westminster panicked. David Cameron
and the rest of the UK government had never expected it to get to this point. The solution came
in the form of “the vow”. This was Westminster’s last-ditch attempt at swaying the Scottish
voters and ensuring that they voted no to independence. Two days before the Scots went to the
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polls, the leaders of the UK political establishment, David Cameron, Ed Miliband of Labour and
Nick Clegg of the Liberal Democrats, signed a pledge which appeared on the Daily Record’s
front page, a popular newspaper in Scotland, to deliver further devolution to the Scottish
parliament. The letter specifically mentioned the Scottish parliament having more say on
healthcare spending. The letter concluded with the assertion that “a no vote will deliver faster,
safer and better change than separation” (Daily Record, 2014). Ironically, devolution was the
mechanism that had allowed the SNP to gain a second political venue which allowed them to
thrive but then, devolution was used as a means to stop full independence from being achieved.
Salmond responded to this vow of increased devolution skeptically. He pointed out that this
promise was a desperate attempt by the government to derail the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign and
added that they may not keep the promises. For instance, Nick Clegg had previously promised to
scrap tuition fees before entering into a coalition with the Conservatives which then led him to
abandon this promise, thus drastically damaging the Liberal Democrats credibility (Hassan, Ed,
2009). Despite Salmond’s protestations, the vow was a powerful tactic to court the undecided
voters in the final days before the polls opened.
In the end, the ‘Better Together’ side emerged victorious with 55.3% of the vote,
compared to the 44.7% in favor of independence (UK Government, 2014). There was an
incredibly high turnout of 84.6%, which was the highest turnout of any UK election since the
introduction of universal suffrage. The referendum was a democratic success story despite the
failure of the SNP to deliver the desired result. The campaign was all-consuming across a wide
range of demographics and groups. The Scottish voters waited to see whether the devolution
promises that had been mentioned in ‘the vow’ would be delivered.
The Aftermath of ‘No’
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The impact of the referendum was substantial. Although it put the very survival of the
Scottish National Party in jeopardy, the impact went beyond that. First, it sparked a new trend
across the UK, with a new wave of demand for decentralization and the re-balancing of power.
This movement spread across a variety of regions, not just in Scotland, such as counties or cities,
expressing a desire for greater autonomy rather than being exclusively represented at
Westminster. Second, the referendum captivated the entire country and made politics accessible
to Scots that had never been interested in the political process. Third, it irrevocably changed the
relationship between Scotland and Westminster. The UK government realized that they needed
to rebuild the relationship in the years following the referendum, by carrying out devo-max that
had been promised.
The world waited with bated breath to see what Alex Salmond would do. He had
dedicated his entire political career to the independence movement and had failed to reach his
ultimate goal. Both the pro-union and pro-independence sides had agreed that this would be a
once in a generation decision with no second chances. Following the referendum defeat, Alex
Salmond held a press conference at Bute House, the official residence of the First Minster, and
announced he would resign, insisting that “the campaign continues, and the dream shall never
die”. Salmond had been the face of the SNP since the 1990s and had been the leader during the
SNP’s first time in government in 2007 and fundamentally altered the dynamics of Scottish
politics (Macwhirter, 2014). By adopting a firm gradualist line, Salmond had managed to unify
the party unlike ever before and come within inches of independence.
It seemed evitable that the referendum result would be the end for the SNP. Their entire
journey from a small single-issue party to the governing party of Scotland had led to this moment
– the referendum. They had grown their electoral support that had been sporadically distributed
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and managed to transfer this support into MP seats. However, at the final hurdle, they failed to
attain independence. However, surprisingly to some, this has not meant the end for the SNP.
Quite the opposite. Following Salmond’s departure, Nicola Sturgeon stood for the leadership,
with no one attempting to challenge her. The partnership she had struck up with Alex Salmond
meant that she was already a well-known face within the party and was therefore well placed to
continue the campaign for independence. Importantly, Sturgeon never explicitly promised that
there could be no second referendum the way Salmond did. Rather, she has insisted that it is up
to the people of Scotland to decide, not for a politician (Macwhirter, 2014).
In the months following the failed referendum. the SNP’s membership skyrocketed with
just 25,000 members in December 2013 increasing to 115,000 by December 2015 despite the
referendum failure (House of Commons, 2017) which gave the SNP the third largest party
membership of all the Westminster parties, replacing the Liberal Democrats. The SNP was in a
great position to continue their objective of independence with a strong presence in Holyrood
and their support was beginning to grow. This increase in membership numbers signified that the
appetite for independence remained throughout Scotland and that the SNP was far from
becoming irrelevant in British politics.
Under Sturgeon’s leadership, the SNP achieved the unthinkable by finally making an
impact in Westminster. In the 2015 General Election, of the 59 Scottish Westminster seats, the
SNP won 56; an increase of 50 seats since 2010. This was the complete elimination of the
Labour Party in Scotland at Westminster that had long been in the making. Since the arrival of
the SNP on the electoral scene, it was consistently a rivalry between Labour and the SNP for the
votes of left-leaning, middle-class voters as religion effectively disappeared as a factor. This
result was a signal that the voters were completely rejecting Labour in Scotland because of the
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way they behaved during the 2014 referendum. In the months following the referendum, no
progress was made regarding ‘the vow’ that had been promised. Scottish voters felt betrayed. In
exchange for voting to remain in the union, they had been promised further autonomy and
instead, they found themselves marginalized and ignored as Westminster went back to the status
quo and prepared for the 2015 election. This mistake would give further fuel to the SNP and in
turn, Scotland’s place in the union would be once again be put to the test following David
Cameron’s decision to hold a referendum on EU membership.
Chapter 7: Brexit’s Impact on Scotland
There is indisputably a special link between the 2014 Scottish independence (often
referred to as “indy”) referendum and the 2016 EU membership referendum for Scots. In the lead
up to the indy referendum, the ‘Better Together’ campaign frequently insisted that the only way
to secure a continued Scottish membership in the European Union was by voting to remain a part
of the UK. However, in 2016, the tables turned and Scottish voters were faced with a referendum
that threatened their continued membership of the EU. The SNP mobilized in defense of EU
membership as the rest of the UK establishment struggled to unify on whether they were going to
be pro-Europe or pro-Brexit. Both the Conservatives and Labour experienced internal party splits
that hindered their ability to present a united message on the EU. Nicola Sturgeon asserted early
on that the Scottish National Party were committed to protecting Scotland’s place in Europe.
Why call a referendum?
David Cameron made the decision to promise a referendum in the lead up to the 2015
general election. This came as a result of the growing dissention within the Conservative party
with regard to the UK’s place in Europe. In addition, the United Kingdom Independence Party,
UKIP, became a strong presence among right-leaning voters on account of its anti-immigration
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and anti-UK integration platform (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2015). Anti-EU sentiment was growing
among typical Tory voters, especially following the 2008 economic crisis which had pushed the
integrated bloc of states to breaking point. Cameron, who was fervently in favor of a continued
membership of the EU, believed that a referendum was the best mechanism to put the issue to
rest. After all, the use of a referendum had worked well for him with regard to the issue of
Scottish independence. This would be a way in which Cameron could appease the anti-Europe
faction within the Conservatives and then allow him to continue as PM with a more unified party
behind him. David Cameron promised that the UK government would negotiate a new settlement
with Brussels and ask the UK voters to either accept this new relationship with the EU or they
would withdraw entirely from the European Union. Following the Conservative party managing
to win back their majority in Westminster, the decision to hold the referendum was confirmed. It
would take place on June 26th, 2016 and just like in 2014, this would be the most monumental
decision faced by voters in a generation.
The Conservative party managed to rid themselves of the Liberal Democrats as they no
longer needed them as part of a coalition to form a majority government. While the
Conservatives did moderately well in England and Wales, they held only one seat in Scotland
(Pike, 2015). Scotland was completely under the control of the Scottish National Party. This
further fueled the growing disconnect between the Scottish voters and the rest of the UK’s
electorate. The Scots were further developing a taste for devolution and enjoying their separate
identity, away from Westminster. The SNP continued to make social justice issues a priority,
focusing further improving Scotland’s public services and opening Scotland to refugees from the
Middle East (Brooks, 2016).
The Campaigns Begin
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Just like the 2014 independence referendum, the two campaigns began to form - ‘Britain
Stronger in Europe’, which came to be referred to as ‘Vote Remain’, and ‘Vote Leave’ (Holbot,
2016). High level government officials began to pick sides. David Cameron made it clear that he
believed the obvious choice was to remain in the EU with a new settlement from Brussels.
Theresa May, the Home Secretary, George Osbourne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and
Phillp Hammond, the Foreign Secretary, agreed that remaining was the best option. However,
other high-ranking Tories disagreed, which included Boris Johnson, the former Mayor of
London, Michael Gove, Justice Secretary, and Chris Grayling, the Leader of the Commons. The
Labour party were more unified with regard to backing remain; however, the Labour leader,
Jeremy Corbyn, was accused of sabotaging Labour’s campaign to keep the UK in the EU
(Asthana, 2016); opponents accused Corbyn of providing Labour with no direction or leadership.
Both the SNP and the Liberal Democrats had total party unity on the subject of EU membership,
with all MPs campaigning to remain.
Once again, the British media had a part to play. The UK’s political establishment was
being torn apart internally. The media were split regarding whether they were pro or anti Brexit,
unlike during the Scottish Indy referendum. The media would frequently raise a possible policy
issue as a result of Brexit or remaining within the EU, and the campaigns would respond. For
instance, how would the UK fare on the outside of the single-market? What would a ‘Vote
Leave’ victory mean for Northern Ireland that borders the Republic of Ireland? There were talks
of the need for a border if the UK was no longer a part of the European Union which contributed
to fresh fervor for a reunified Ireland. What would happen to the thousands of European citizens
that lived and worked across the UK? Moreover, what about the British citizens scattered across
the European Union? Would they have to return home? ‘Vote Remain’ hoped that these
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unknowns would scare the electorate to vote overwhelmingly to remain. Unfortunately, the
waves of euroscepticism that had swept across the UK since the 1980s were coming to boiling
point. On top of that, the refugee crisis that had led to the increase in immigrants coming to the
UK further aided ‘Vote Leave’s message.
At this point, the referendum was getting out of control with possible policy issues and
beyond what David Cameron could have predicted. He returned from Brussels following
extensive negotiations with several concessions from the EU including the power to limit EU
migrants’ in-work benefits and a treaty change which allowed the UK to be exempt from the
‘ever closer union’ policy which had alarmed anti-integration supporters at Westminster (Holbot,
2015). Unfortunately for David Cameron, the narrative for the campaign had already been
established as immigration vs. economics debate. The ‘Vote Leave’ side insisted that the UK was
being overrun with immigrants, thus making life harder for Britain’s middle and lower class,
known as the “left-behind voters” (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). On the other hand, ‘Britain
Stronger in Europe’ attempted to reduce the referendum to a purely economic choice, much like
‘Better Together’ did regarding the currency union for Scotland in 2014. The two campaigns
built their own distinctive narrative on the two major policy issues and therefore, no constructive
debate occurred between the two sides.
The SNP attempted to stay out of the fray by running their own separate campaign from
the parties at Westminster, known as ‘Scotland Stronger In Europe’. A key strength that the SNP
already had was the ability to build a positive campaign among an already politically active
electorate. Rather than relying on a ‘Better Together’ tactic of drawing attention to the risks of
the unknown, the SNP drew voters’ attention to what the EU does for Scots. For example,
“hundreds of thousands of jobs in Scotland are linked to trade with the rest of Europe (Scotland
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Stronger In Europe, 2016)”. They also used their commitment for devolution from Westminster
to distance themselves from the chaotic campaigns in the rest of the UK. The Scottish campaign
also pointed out that the EU guaranteed protections to Scottish citizens such as “worker’s
rights … paid holiday leave, equal pay and anti-discrimination” laws (Scotland Stronger In
Europe, 2016). I argue that the SNP has an outstanding ability to run campaigns with positive
messages at the core. In the indy referendum, they were able to run a cultural campaign to enable
Scots to take control of their own destiny. In 2016, they were able to do the same by building the
message that Scotland is a vibrant part of Europe and the world. In the case of Westminster
campaigns, for both 2014 and 2016, they ran boring campaigns based on fear rather than
advantages. Despite the dynamic campaign, the SNP watched in shock as the rest of the UK
became more and more supportive of leaving the economic union that the Scottish economy
relied on.
The Result
The end result of the 2016 referendum shocked the world. David Cameron’s gamble did
not pay off. The right-wing, pro-UKIP wing of the Conservative party had managed to convince
a bulk of the UK electorate that the opportunity of independence from the EU was too good to
miss. The economic, ‘project fear’ tactics that had been successful in Scotland failed to convince
the UK electorate as a whole. Although there were certain geographic areas that were more proEU than others, such as Scotland, London and Northern Ireland, the result ended with 48.11%
voting to remain and 51.89% voting to leave (Hassan and Gunson, Eds, 2017). The SNP’s
enlarged membership demanded to know how the Scottish government would respond. In the
immediate aftermath of the vote, Nicola Sturgeon announced that another independence
referendum was now “highly likely” (Hassan & Gunson, 2017).
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Much like Alex Salmond, David Cameron was faced with the dilemma of what he should
do next following the referendum defeat. Like Salmond, Cameron decided to resign, leaving the
Conservative party in chaos. On the morning following the referendum, Cameron emerged from
Downing Street, proclaiming that he didn’t “think it would be right for him to try to be the
captain that steers our country to its next destination” (BBC, 2016) on account of his fervent
belief that the UK should have voted to remain in the EU. Cameron’s resignation ignited a power
struggle within the Conservative party that would determine the direction in which the
government would take Brexit. The leadership race concluded with Theresa May emerging
victorious but in a difficult position (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). After campaigning for ‘Vote
Remain’, she was faced with having to carry out the wishes of the ‘Vote Leave’ side of risk a
revolt from inside her party. On the other hand, as Home Secretary she had insisted that for the
sake of security in the UK, it was in our best interest to remain in the EU. This placed her in a
difficult position. Meanwhile, the Labour party was in the same chaotic position as the Tories.
Jeremy Corbyn’s half-hearted campaigning for remain had left his cabinet and backbenchers
doubting his ability as leader (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). There was calls for his resignation.
Westminster had descended into mayhem.
In the middle of all of this was Scotland. There were now two conflicting mandates at
work. On one hand, there was the 55% of Scots that had voted to remain in the United Kingdom
and the 45% that had voted to leave. On the other hand, there were the 62% of Scots that had
voted to remain in the European Union and just 38% that wanted to leave (Hassan & Gunson,
Eds, 2017). This further split an electorate that was already hyper-active with regard to politics.
It is of course especially difficult for Scotland as the continued membership of the EU was such
a big part of the 2014 indy referendum. The SNP crafted a political message throughout its
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development of inclusiveness, especially with regard to the European Union. Furthermore, the
SNP were given a new lease of life with the UK’s decision to leave the EU because it was a
perfect example of Scotland’s democratic wishes being overturned by Westminster (Hassan and
Gunson, Eds, 2017).
In the weeks and months following the 2016 referendum vote, the UK electorate waited
to see whether the Conservative government would actually follow through on starting
proceedings to leave the EU. The divided regions and demographic factors across the UK made
any progress difficult for the Conservative government. May’s government attempted to get its
act together and form a solid strategy. Corbyn survived calls for his resignation and began to
mount a feeble opposition to the Tories. The SNP’s strong presence in Westminster following
their landslide victory in 2015 came back into play. The 56 SNP MPs were led by Angus
Robertson, who had taken over for Alex Salmond following his decision to return to Holyrood
and serve as First Minister in 2007. In a way, Robertson took up the role of leader of the
opposition in an attempt to fill the role that Labour was leaving vacant. This in turn led to the
SNP being covered more in the media and continuing the erode the misperception that the SNP
were finished following the failed referendum in 2014.
Negotiations between the British government and the European Union began in March
2017, giving the UK government two years to complete the process. Nicola Sturgeon has been
exploring a wide variety of possible options for Scotland but is in a difficult position because
negotiations are taking place between Westminster and Brussels, further marginalizing the
wishes of the Scottish people. A number of possibilities have been discussed. Firstly, there were
talks of the Brexit vote requiring the approval of the UK jurisdictions, meaning Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland in addition to Westminster. There were also those that wanted the British

69

electorate to have a final say on the deal that would emerge following negotiations, but these
were dismissed as out of hand (Hassan and Gunson, 2017). Secondly, Westminster could
devolve the power to Holyrood that would allow them to remain in the EU whilst the rest of the
UK would leave. However, this too relied on the ability of Holyrood to negotiate with the EU,
which was not possible as Holyrood was being represented by Westminster. Thirdly and most
popular of all, the Scottish parliament could be devolved the power to allow Scotland to remain a
member of the single market but not a full member of the EU (Hassan and Gunson, 2016). Much
is unclear currently as negotiations continue and it is not yet known what kind of a deal the UK
government will emerge with. What appears to be developing is a tug of war between Holyrood
and Westminster for legislative autonomy on Brexit.
Brussels has been placed in a difficult position as a result of the contentious climate
between Spain and Catalonia since 2017. Spain is currently trying to deal with a separatist
movement that threatens the territorial integrity of the country (Moreno et al, 1998). Tensions
have risen over the past several decades and are close to breaking point. The Catalan
government has expressed interest in independence from Spain but also a desire to remain in the
European Union. Following a non-binding referendum, Spain has insisted that Brussels cannot
negotiate with the sub-national group. Therefore, the same approach must be used with regard to
Scotland as they are a sub-national group seeking separate negotiations. The EU must have a
standard strategy for dealing with separatist groups, but this threatens Scotland’s chances at a
settlement of remaining in the EU whilst also remaining a part of the UK. This could reignite the
independence debate; the SNP could reenergize their indy campaign as it becomes a debate of
whether the UK or EU membership is best for Scotland.
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The 2017 General Election
Theresa May made the decision to call for a general election ahead of the 2020 scheduled
election in an attempt to increase her mandate so that the government could deliver a Brexit with
strong support from her party. Between March and April of 2017, negotiation progress was slow.
May decided that the election would bring new energy to the negotiations. Moreover, she pointed
out that it would be better to hold one early before the Brexit negotiations truly got started or the
country would risk dividing their attention between the completion of negotiations and a general
election in 2020 (BBC, 2017). Calling an election also seemed logical as Labour continued their
internal squabbling over Corbyn’s leadership. It was expected that the Conservatives would be
able to pick up more seats to cement their position and the country could focus on achieving the
best possible deal from Brussels. May handled the election badly, taking a back seat and thus
allowing other candidates, particularly Corbyn to shine. Rather than showing the electorate that
the Brexit negotiations were in safe hands, May came off as incompetent and withdrawn.
Assuming that victory was assured turned out to be a dreadfully naïve assumption. What actually
occurred was a complete rejection of May’s approach to Brexit and left the country in even more
chaos.
Theresa May had miscalculated. Instead of uniting the country, she had lost the majority
that David Cameron had managed to achieve in 2015 and had forced the Tories back into
coalition territory. In order to have a sufficient number of seats to hold a majority, Theresa May
teamed up with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern Ireland. The Liberal
Democrats, the former coalition party, made it clear as soon as the election was called in April
that they would not enter into a coalition with the Tories (Liberal Democrats, 2017). Since the
2011 coalition with the Tories, the Liberal Democrats had been fighting to regain their
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diminished credibility. Without the option of the Liberal Democrats, May was forced to join with
the controversial DUP – a move that was met with a barrage of criticism from the SNP. The
DUP only agreed to enter into an agreement with the Conservatives if they were provided with
more funding, which eventually led to a £500m deal (UK Government, 2017). In exchange for
the funds, the DUP would support the Tories on all motions of confidence, the budget and bills.
Sturgeon argued that this was unethical of the Conservative party to enter into this deal because
it was allowing Northern Ireland to have more funds that either Wales or Scotland, the two other
devolved administrations. The move by May to form this deal made the Conservatives appear to
be clinging onto power and seem even more out of touch with the average UK voter.
The Labour party performed much better than expected but still incredibly poorly in
Scotland. In the aftermath of Brexit, Corbyn had been forced to fight for his position as leader of
the party. He was under a great deal of pressure to ensure Labour would perform well in the
election or he would inevitably face yet another leadership challenge and this would likely be his
last. Although Labour wasn’t predicted to do well in the election, Corbyn surprised the country
by gaining thirty seats which directly led to the Tories being unable to form a majority
government (BBC, 2017). In 2015, the Labour party had been left with just one seat left in
Scotland; after 2017, they had managed to add six more, signifying a small resurgence in Labour
support. This highlighted the fact that Labour had relied heavily on the Scottish electorate in the
past in order to be an electable force in Westminster. With the SNP as the alternative, the Labour
party was struggling to maintain its reputation as one of the two establishment parties in
Scotland. Instead, it was becoming an SNP vs. Tory fight with Labour watching from the
sidelines.
With regard to the SNP, the party found its position weakened as the number of MPs
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diminished from 56 to 35. Almost immediately after the results were finalized, the SNP was
proclaimed by the media to have lost the election and were on the way out. I argue that one must
be careful about how to evaluate the impact of this decrease in MPs for the SNP. In the 2010
general election, the SNP won 6 seats in Westminster. In 2015, they won 56. This was an
unprecedented and historic event. As mentioned previously, this was a direct response by
Scottish voters expressing their frustration with the way the Westminster establishment
continued to marginalize Scotland. In 2017, the outrage had diminished slightly and many of
those who had voted SNP as a protest vote reverted back to their old party leanings of Tory or
Labour. To say that the 2017 general election was a loss for the SNP is premature. Rather, one
only has to look at the trajectory of the SNP votes that for the party to go from 6 seats in 2010 to
35 in 2017 is still a huge number. In addition, historically, the SNP have done much better in
Holyrood elections when compared to Westminster (Hassan & Barrow, 2017). Although the
number of seats decreased, this does not signify the end is nigh for the SNP.
There is some speculation that this decrease in SNP MPs shows the support for
independence wavering. Rather, this decrease comes as a response to the evolution of Scottish
politics. Much like Northern Ireland, the political context in Scotland is developing around the
single constitutional issue of devolution and independence. The Tories have cemented
themselves as the party of the union, whilst the Scottish National Party is the party for
independence. This seems to leave Labour out of the picture in Scotland. The SNP is the party of
the left. For Scottish voters, it is now a question of whether you value social justice but are
willing to vote for independence or do you value the survival of the union more than the actual
policy platform. The Liberal Democrats, who attempt to stay in the middle, can no longer
function in Scotland. The question of independence has gone from a fringe-issue to a central
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policy decision. Without a decisive referendum in Scotland, it seems unlikely that this dilemma
will go away. Rather, it will continue and become all the more controversial and consuming.
Theresa May’s decision to hold an early election did more harm than good. The
Conservative majority was destroyed, and a costly coalition deal had to be struck. The SNP were
brought back down to earth from their 2015 landslide. Theresa May should have focused her
attention on delivering Brexit negotiations that would provide the British people with a strong
deal that they could get behind. This would have then meant that the Conservatives could have
fought a 2020 general election with a proud record to defend. Instead, May took a gamble that
resulted in the loss of her majority, the loss of £500m to the DUP to keep her position as PM and
gave Labour even more seats to prevent the passing of her legislation. For now, May must focus
on achieving the best possible deal for Britain. However, the question of what a good deal would
look like is still up for debate. The fractured Conservative party are divided on what parts of the
EU they should seek to remain a part of. Should they stay in the single market? Should they keep
the freedom of movement policy? Will a border between the UK and EU need to be constructed?
Once these answers come to light, it will become clearer as to what will happen to the union and
Scotland’s place within it.
Chapter 8: Four Possible Futures for Scotland and the Union
The SNP-led government risks Scotland being dragged out of the European Union
despite the large support held by Scots for the institution. The party grew and developed on the
contingency that Scotland could eventually be independent from the UK. However, the context is
now more complex. Devolution has further convoluted matters; the Scottish parliament was
created by Westminster, meaning that the UK government is attempting to continue acting like a
unitary state negotiating with Brussels. However, the autonomy that devolution has given
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Scotland means that there will be near constant legal challenges from the devolved legislatures,
especially from Scotland. It is clear now that devolution took place with no real safeguards in
place in the event of a large-scale constitutional question (Hassan & Gunson, Eds, 2017). For
Nicola Sturgeon, remaining inside the European Union is paramount to Scotland’s future
economic success. But how can this happen? Will there be a second independence referendum
for the Scots to rid themselves of the UK for good and therefore remain in the EU? Will Scotland
stay within the UK and realize life on the outside of the EU is challenging? Will the UK thrive
outside the EU and will Scotland remain with them? I argue that there are four strong
possibilities, all within the complex context of Brexit, each with varying levels of likeliness.
Possibility 1: A 2nd Referendum and a Yes Vote
The first possibility is that the SNP are able to manage to call a 2nd referendum, a feat that
seems difficult at the moment. The first referendum in 2014 was only possible because David
Cameron and his government allowed the power to hold it to be sent to Holyrood from
Westminster temporarily. Moreover, both the pro-independence side and pro-union side
contended that it would be a once in a generation referendum. However, Nicola Sturgeon had
originally wanted to have a referendum on independence before the end of the two-year Brexit
negotiations, meaning before March 2019. This goal was crushed fairly early as Theresa May
insisted that “now is not the time” (Hassan and Barrow, 2017). This rhetoric could mean that this
leaves the door open to a second vote but only after the Brexit negotiations are complete.
Unfortunately, this premise complicates matters for the SNP. If the Scottish government is
forced to wait till after negotiations conclude, the SNP will have to hold a referendum during a
period of even more uncertainty regarding the EU. There is no guarantee that Scotland could be
immediately allowed back into the EU. Rather, Scotland could be forced into lengthy
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negotiations with Brussels whilst also negotiating its way out of the United Kingdom. Since the
Brexit vote, Sturgeon and the SNP have insisted that the circumstances have changed. The UK
that Scottish voters decided to remain a part of no longer exists. It is now up to the SNP to craft a
campaign that reassures undecided voters that membership of the EU is more important than
continued membership with the UK. As is evident from the 2014 referendum, the SNP struggled
to attract unsure voters because they focused their campaign heavily on the policy goals of an
independent Scotland but not the financial or economic strategies that would be needed.
However, the SNP have already proven themselves capable of running positive campaigns that
can capture the attention of the electorate. It is not impossible that the SNP could learn from their
mistakes and finally achieve their ultimate goal.
But what would happen to the SNP as a governing party if they achieve independence? I
argue that the party has positioned itself as Scotland’s social democratic party, replacing Labour
along the way. For this reason, it is very possible that the SNP could continue on as the
governing party of Scotland. However, it is difficult to predict what would happen to the proindependence voter’s political allegiances after independence is achieved. They could very well
return to their former parties, meaning either Labour or the Conservatives. On the other hand,
they could make the decision to stay with the SNP since they would have rid themselves of the
Westminster establishment, thus making it easier for the SNP to pursue their policy goals.
As an independent country, the Scottish government would be able to deal directly with
Brussels. Nicola Sturgeon would be in a position to travel to Brussels and meet with negotiators
without having to compete with what Westminster wants. There is of course the problem of
Brussels being under such pressure from Spain with regard to Catalonia. Brussels would be in a
difficult position as the Spanish government insists that Brussels should not deal with separatist
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movements. I argue however that because the Scottish government would have held a
referendum with the approval of Westminster, it would be hard for Brussels to completely ignore
the will of Scotland to join the EU.
Possibility 2: A 2nd Referendum and a No Vote
The second possibility is that the SNP are able to hold a second referendum on
independence but that yet again, the electorate asserted that they didn’t want to leave the UK.
This could occur as a result of Theresa May managing to get a strong trade deal between the UK
and Brussels. If this occurred, Scottish voters may make the decision to remain in the UK despite
the fact that the UK would no longer be a part of the European Union. However, voters may
think this is preferable compared to the long period of great uncertainty that would be assured if
they decided to become independent from the UK and then had to rely on the Scottish
government managing to get Scotland back into the EU.
This second possibility would be disastrous for the SNP. I predict that if a second
referendum took place and the answer from the Scottish people was still no, the SNP could verge
on collapse. The die-hard independence supporters would feel betrayed that the SNP had been
given a second chance and squandered it. They would then leave and return to either Labour or
the Conservatives and at the next Holyrood election, the SNP MSP seats would evaporate,
leaving them unable to form a government. Although the national movement for independence
would not disappear, a second no vote would kill the actual possibility of independence for at
least a generation. It would fade into the background if the SNP were no longer in government
and perhaps, the status-quo of Tories vs. Labour would return.
Possibility 3: No 2nd Referendum and Further Devolution
The third possibility would likely ensure that the SNP would be in government for years
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to come and furthermore, the goal of independence would remain a politicized issue at the
forefront of the political agenda. At the end of the Brexit negotiations, Theresa May could come
back with a deal from the EU and insist that now was still not the time for the SNP to hold
another referendum. As a concession, Westminster could grant some of the powers that they had
taken back from Brussels and devolve them to Holyrood. These devolved powers could include
powers over Scottish fishing, food safety, immigration or taxes (Hassan & Gunson, Eds, 2017).
The goal of this would be to quell demands from the SNP that they had waited to see what the
terms of the Brexit deal would be and now they would like the right to democratically decide if
they’d like to continue UK membership. If this was to happen, the UK government has the
potential to save the union. This could be done by going down a path of further federalization in
an attempt to enter into a fresh type of union with the devolved administrations.
Further devolution would split the SNP once again in a way reminiscent of the gradualistfundamentalist debate the party had in the 1970s. Some SNP supporters would say that further
devolution would be enough for the foreseeable future and that it would be better for a second
referendum to be put on the back burner until Scotland had more of an idea what life on the
outside of the EU was like. On the other hand, some supporters would say that Scotland was just
continuing to be ruled by Westminster and now, Scotland would not have the protections from
the EU that they had previously enjoyed. They would argue that further devolution is not good
enough and that rather, the time for a second referendum was now so that Scotland wouldn’t be
on the outside of the EU for too long. The internal party disagreement would run the risk of
killing the momentum that the party had carefully been growing since they had entered
government at Holyrood in 2007.
Provided that the SNP were able to hold their party together, they could continue to
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govern in Holyrood and with even more policy areas to work with. This could allow them to
further build the case for independence, especially if Scotland’s economy begins to struggle on
the outside of the European Union. However, once again, the SNP would come up against the
uncertainty of whether or not Brussels would be open to them rejoining immediately. Skeptics
have pointed out that Scotland may not automatically be considered. There are other states that
have expressed an interest in joining the EU. To counter this claim, I can point out that none of
the states that are currently in the process of trying to join the EU have been a member of the EU
previously, whilst Scotland has.
Possibility 4: No 2nd Referendum and No New Powers
The fourth and final possibility would likely occur and then lead to a second referendum,
but it is not clear as to when this would happen. If Theresa May returned from Brussels with a
deal, either good or bad, she might decide not to devolve further powers to Scotland. Perhaps she
may want a promise that the Scottish government would agree to hold no further referendums on
independence before giving further powers to Scotland. The SNP could then meet this demand
by attacking Westminster for holding the democratic will of the Scottish people to ransom.
Moreover, Theresa May could simply insist that no more devolution will be occurring, in a bid to
reverse the trend of decentralization that began in 1997. Arguably, it was the start of devolution
that gave rise to a more powerful SNP.
If there are no new powers given to the Scottish government, a second referendum would
remain on the table. Sturgeon has held onto this threat as a stick to beat Westminster with
whenever they go against Scotland’s wishes. Politics in Scotland are beginning to mirror the
politics of Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland, politics revolve around the constitutional
question of whether they truly belong in the UK or whether they should rejoin Ireland. This
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question has grown in complexity with the Brexit vote. Ireland is a part of the European Union
whilst when the UK no longer is, Northern Ireland will be on the outside of the EU. This raises
the dilemma of how the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland will work. The
constitutional question has shaped the nature of Northern Irish politics and the same seems to be
happening in Scotland (Hassan and Barrow, 2017). Right now, there is a risk that Scottish
politics is going to descend into pro vs. anti-independence as the debate grows in both
contentiousness and complexity. It is remarkable that the SNP began as a fringe, single-issue
party and they have managed to grow both themselves and the issue of independence itself so
that it now threatens to completely takeover Scottish politics until an acceptable conclusion is
reached.
Which possibility is most likely?
Of these four possibilities, it is difficult to say with certainty which of these is most
probable. It is also important to point out that there are many variables involved in these
predictions and that it is possible some of these variables could change. After all, a week is a
long time in politics. For instance, it is possible that Theresa May will no longer be prime
minister by the time these negotiations conclude in 2019. There may be a new head of the
Conservative party that could steer the party towards a harder or softer Brexit. The ConservativeDUP coalition could collapse, leading to yet another general election. The Labour party could
build on their successes from 2017 and manage to gain a majority in the event of a general
election, thus throwing the Brexit negotiations into chaos. The EU could stand firm and not
allow Scotland to immediately re-enter. On the other hand, they could allow the Scotland’s reentrance to the EU to be expedited. This is not impossible. In the past, the EU have made
exceptions – they fast-tracked both Eastern Germany and Cyprus when they applied to join
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(Hassan & Gunson, Eds, 2017). There are also demands from parties, such as the Liberal
Democrats, insisting that there should be a second referendum on the Brexit deal, effectively
giving the British people the power to back out of the exit entirely. The SNP could be met
backlash on account of a policy they have implemented in the past which could cost them
support. For instance, during the time that this paper was being completed, Scotland and the
entire UK were in the middle of a particularly strong flu season that was pushing the National
Health Service (NHS) to breaking point. Sturgeon and health ministers were being met with
anger from patients who were facing operations and procedures being cancelled due to weatherrelated and flu pressures (Johnson, 2018). The SNP are not immune to policy failure. Brexit
negotiations continue, and it is still no clearer as to what the outcome of the negotiations will be.
In the next year, the SNP must continue to nurture their core voters and continue to hold
Westminster to account at both Westminster and Holyrood.
Conclusion
The SNP has been the dominant political force in Scotland for over ten years and has
recently emerged as a force in British politics. It is necessary to take stock of what they have
achieved and what their blunders have been. With the creation of Holyrood, the SNP initially
struggled to adjust to their new legislative arena whilst maintaining a presence at Westminster.
This struggle was not limited to just the SNP, both the Scottish Conservatives and Scottish
Labour endeavored to hone their policy platforms towards the Scottish electorate on devolved
issues (Hassan and Barrow, 2017). The SNP were taken in the right direction under the
leadership of Alex Salmond when he returned as leader in 2004 from Westminster. His return
was the catalyst that began the SNP’s professionalization regarding party financing, campaigning
and policy-making. Once the SNP entered into a minority government in 2007, the party focused
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on social justice issues towards the left of the political spectrum, putting it into direct conflict
with Labour. The party also focused on campaigning for independence in a positive light in an
attempt to bring more voters to their cause. As the SNP’s experience in government grew, so did
the policy goals they wanted to pursue. The British media began to take more notice of them,
especially as the upcoming independence referendum was announced in 2011.
Whilst the SNP’s internal transformation was the dominant reason for their rise, the
external context must be considered as well. The party was able to use Westminster as their
adversary and blame them for their policy failings. For instance, spending cuts and budget
constraints imposed by the UK government on the Scottish government allowed the SNP to often
divert responsibility for its policy failings towards Westminster (Hassan and Barrow, Eds, 2017).
Budget austerity makes it difficult for the SNP to implement certain legislation which in turn,
frustrates the SNP’s left-leaning base. The SNP is constantly struggling to find the balance whilst
maintaining its central policy goal of independence. In addition to the ever-present dominance of
Westminster, the UK political parties’ treatment of the SNP also contributed to the resulting SNP
dominance. Neither the Labour party nor the Conservatives took the threat of independence
seriously until the SNP were already making impressive gains during general elections. Neither
of them could compete with the positive message of inclusiveness and social justice that the SNP
rallied behind. The Liberal Democrats refused to enter into coalition with the SNP in 2007,
which resulted in the SNP creating a minority government and this in turn was the beginning
stage of SNP dominance in Holyrood. The collapse of the Scottish Socialist party in the run up to
the 2007 Holyrood election meant that many of the Socialist voters voted for the SNP instead.
Suffice to say that the SNP improved internally but it also owes a great deal of its success to the
underestimation and actions from other UK political parties.
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For now, it is still unclear as to what the future holds for Scotland and the United
Kingdom. The 2017 general election was yet another bump in the road for the SNP. As is evident
from tracing their journey back to when they first formed, the remaking of the SNP has not
always been a smooth journey. I believe that if the SNP are to be successful, the party must reexamine their policy record and continue to re-invent themselves with a clear, long-term strategy
despite the chaotic times we are living in. Only then will the party be able to complete their final
goal of independence whilst maintaining their role as Scotland’s governing party. The SNP are
faced with the challenge of attempting to speak for an entire nation despite the fact that their
popular appeal is limited (Hassan & Barrow, Eds, 2017). Furthermore, they have been in power
for ten years now, meaning that they now have a policy record to defend to their opponents or to
celebrate amongst their supporters. Now that the SNP have entered the third and final stage of
becoming a credible governing third-party, they no longer possess what had originally made
them so appealing – the role of the outsider, fringe group. They are now part of the Scottish
establishment and are struggling to maintain the momentum that brought them to power. The
Scottish electorate turned out in their droves to vote for independence in 2014 but since then,
they have had to vote in two general elections and another referendum on EU membership. The
Scottish people could be growing tired of making large-scale, political decisions and this could
put a damper on a second indy referendum if it were to take place.
As for the UK and the EU, only time will tell. The entire international community is
watching the Brexit negotiations with great interest. The vote to leave the EU came as a result of
a culmination of economic anger, cultural anxiety and political alienation (Hassan & Gunson,
Eds, 2017). Now that Article 50 has been triggered, the two sides must now negotiate an exit
deal and then, an EU-UK trade deal. In addition, new agreements must be reached on security
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and foreign policy issues. It is a daunting task and it will inevitably shape what could happen to
the UK and the EU. If a bad deal is reached, perhaps with the UK on the outside of the single
market, the UK government risks giving fresh ammunition to the SNP-led Scottish government,
reigniting the question of independence. This could also have repercussions in Wales and
Northern Ireland. If the EU handle the negotiations badly, they risk other member-states holding
referendums on membership and the eventual unravelling of the whole multi-national entity. The
Eurozone’s economy is growing at its fastest pace since the economic downturn, with GDP
growth up by 0.6% (Eurostat, 2018). This is likely to be met with dismay at Westminster and
further push Scotland to independence in an attempt to remain in the area of economic growth. It
is startlingly clear that in this period of uncertainty, any number of possibilities are feasible, and I
look forward to observing the myriad of variables collide in the future.
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